Why the German Army failed in the West 43-44
The German Army had serious problems with conducting counter-attacks against the Western Allied Forces in 1943-44 this was different to the Situation on Eastern Front against the Red Army. As such the question is, why was this the case and this is not about logistics.
Disclaimer: I received a pre-release ebook of Prof. Neitzel’s Book “ Deutsche Krieger. Vom Kaiserreich zur Berliner Republik - eine Militärgeschichte ”.
Cover: commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Fi...
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Other modifications: MHV
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» SOURCES «
Neitzel, Sönke: Deutsche Krieger. Vom Kaiserreich zur Berliner Republik - eine Militärgeschichte. Propyläen: Berlin, Germany, 2020.
OKH: Zusammendruck der Ausbildungshinweise Nr. 10-23. Nr. 2000 / 44 geh. H.Qu. OKH, 5. Mai 1944.
BArch, RW 38/183: Oberbefehlshaber West: Erfahrungen und Folgerungen aus den Landungskämpfen von Salerno. 25.12.1943
Glantz, David M.; House, Jonathan M.: Armageddon in Stalingrad. The Stalingrad Trilogy, Volume 2: September-November 1942. University Press of Kansas: United States, 2009.
Dick, C. J.: From Victory to Stalemate. The Western Front, Summer 1944. Decisive and Indecisive Military Operations, Volume 1. University Press of Kansas: Kansas, US, 2016.
Dick, C. J.: From Defeat to Victory. The Eastern Front, Summer 1944. Decisive and Indecisive Military Operations, Volume 2. University Press of Kansas: Kansas, US, 2016.
Citino, Robert M.: The Wehrmacht Retreats: Fighting a Lost War, 1943. University Press Kansas, USA, 2012.
Töppel, Roman: Kursk 1943. The Greatest Battle of the Second World War. Helion: Warwick, UK: 2018.
Citino, Robert M.: The Wehrmacht’s Last Stand. The German Campaigns of 1944-1945. University Press of Kansas: USA, 2017.
Creveld, Martin van: Fighting Power. German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939-1945. Greenwood Press: Westport, Connecticut, USA, 1982.
#WehrmachtFail,#WhyWehrmachtFail,#GermanArmyFail
My father was an artillery observer in North Africa, Sicily, Italy, Southern France, and the Bulge. He remarked once how the German sound ranging equipment was well made, but they did not bury it like US artillery observers were trained to do. When shelling started, German sound ranging wires were quickly cut, while US microphones kept working. Once, on a cold night in Italy, my father ranged in on a German railway gun that was "sniping" at US positions. In clear, cold conditions, he triangulated on the source of the firing. A dive bomber attack at dawn found a railway tunnel at the location he indicated. They bombed both ends of the tunnel. When the lines moved up, they found a large railway gun entombed in the tunnel. Sound ranging allowed my father to locate the gun within six meters of its actual location--this from nearly 20 miles away.
Awesome info there bruv
I've been haunting WW2 info, but never seen the use sound ranging equipment in vids and articles. For ranging incoming air attack yes, but not artillery or other ground activity. What I have seen is large megaphones that don't seem to require 'wire". Very interesting! What kind of thing with wires was your dad using?
Fascinating and very interesting story, thank you for sharing sir!
@@jeffmoore9487 Sound ranging for counterbattery fire was pioneered by the French in World War 1. The legend goes, a French artillery officer was sitting in a latrine when some big guns went off (no jokes, please). He felt a change of air pressure on his bare bottom, and realized this effect could be detected and amplified. During the interwar years, "Sound and Vision" counterbattery techniques were developed by the US Army. The way it worked was, a base line parallel to the enemy line was established. At measured intervals along this line small holes would be dug and lined with an open ended metal cylinder ("like a coffee can," my dad would say). A sensitive microphone would be suspended inside the can, then covered with a lid, then earth. Wires (carefully buried to shield them from shrapnel, etc.) from the mike ran back to the OP. When enemy artillery opened up, signals from the microphones would be picked up, measured for intensity, and the readings transferred to a map. With at least three mikes you could triangulate on the enemy's firing position and order counterbattery fire, or an air strike. More than three mikes gave even better precision. Cold, dry weather was best for sound propagation. Visual counterbattery technique included ranging on muzzle flashes at night, dust and smoke, and aerial recon.
See also en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Artillery_sound_ranging
Kinda creepy. The Prof just sits there staring at you and speaks without moving his lips.....
He's being efficient
is this your first time seeing germans or something? that's what they do. i wouldn't call it creepy, just different.
He is a GERMAN....!
@@MeatGoblin88 Oh. I always thought they sort of sneered and held cigarettes in their upside down hand while speaking. Oh, and don't forget wearing a uniform or if in civilian attire- the leather trench coat and black fedora.
Don't be creeped out, just a transcendental being telepathically communicating with us mortals
The long and short of it is that the Wehrmacht of 1940-1941 did not exist. They had lost too many experienced and gifted officers and men. The Heer of 1943-44 had a huge hemorraging of institutional knowledge and tactical experience. It was like Napoleon's Army in 1813: Too many old hands gone, too many young, inexperienced kids and not enough of everything materially. And, it got without saying, as Napoleon said, the longer a war lasts, the more familiar the enemy with your methods. The Allies were simply much better than they had been in 1940-1941. They were growing with experience, by rotating veterans into training commands, while the Germans were losing theirs.
By far the best summarization. Can be applied 1:1 on the japanese and the pacific Theater as well.
A good overview of what was happening.
@@musclerider1942 Didn’t the Japanese lose their veterans of the Sino-Japanese war, their crack Air Force pilots, their skilled naval crews, etc by the time of midway. Looking up most of Japan’s top flying aces, most seem to have been killed by 1943-early 44. And of course irreplaceable carriers and other ships. Kamikaze pilots also seemed to make a lot more sense logically when bringing up their material and manpower shortages and the Japanese weren’t as brutalistic about their pilots coming back if they didn’t find a target.
@@lufsolitaire5351 the battles of coral sea, midway, and the canal guttied the japanese navy air arm
I might sound like an idiot but serious question. Why was Germany losing their top commanders? I can't imagine they were rushing into battle like Knights from medieval times.
"How do you define fail?" -Red Army raising flag over the Reichstag Building. "Oh..."
25 MILLION DEATHS. I'd say that's a pretty huge failure right there, too. Haha
@@fabiana7157 keep coping wehraboo
@@fabiana7157 First of all your number is wrong. Its actually around 28 million, and 20 million of those are civilian deaths. The soviets only suffered 8.6 million military deaths.
@@fabiana7157 considering the conditions the soviets where forced to fight in, tell me who really took the W here. They improvised with their lives and came out on top in spite of german superiority. The soviets Won unquestionably here.
@@Its_shiki_time4876 If it's a victory at all it was a pyrrhic one. Yes they did occupy Germany (or at least half of it) in the end and this should not be forgotten. However the way they won was...callous to say the least, and that should not be forgotten either.
Fascinating video. Thank You. My father was a tech sergeant radio operator with the 756th Tank Battalion of the 3rd Inf. Division in the Italian campaign. Soon after landing he was detached and assigned to a USN Lieutenant from an off-shore cruiser (I want to say it was the U.S.S. Savannah, but I’m not sure) as a mobile artillery OP communications link in a Jeep at the front lines. He told me they (The whole system) kept the German artillery and other German ground units in a constant state of confusion with the speed in which the Americans could call in off-shore naval gun fire support in response to anything the Germans would attempt to setup or accomplish in the way of counterattacks. He seemed to recall that especially during the earlier phases of the Italian campaign the Germans had a fairly good tactical air presence in the skies above the invasion areas; and during the day too, but almost always in the form of one or two-plane attacks on U.S. ground or off-shore naval forces, never big formations of airplanes. But it was daily nonetheless. One day he witnessed a single German airplane sink a USN ammunition ship. Was the biggest, loudest explosion he’d ever heard.
This was fascinating. I have friends who were in US artillery in the 70's, and they were very much focused on counter battery fire, but I didn't know we were so good at it back in the 40's. I did know that US artillery was very aggressive, in the sense that the cost of barrels and shells wasn't even considered. One other factor in the lack of counter attack, though, was tempo. From reading accounts from Bradley, one of the US focuses was keeping the pressure up at all times. Not letting the Germans rest, even if it meant that the US forces weren't getting enough rest or were moving faster than their supply lines. The rationale of the US generals was that by keeping the constant pressure on the Germans, it would reduce their ability to dig in, and we would avoid the static warfare of WW1, and save US lives, but another bit of that was that it likely reduced the Germans ability to regroup for counter attack. This may all seem trivial, but there was apparently much disagreement between the US and British, where the British wanted more time to prepare, in general, while the US just wanted to keep pushing forward. Not just Patton, but Bradley and the other infantry generals.
I was in the American Army in 88-90. In an MLRS Battery in Germany. We trained in the "shoot and move" tactics. We expected the Russians to counter battery fire us with huge amounts of fire so we move after every practice launch. In fact that is pretty much what our training really amounted to. Moving all the time. We would go out for field problems and move three or four times in a day. We would do this for ten days to two weeks at a go.
Part of that for the British was they did not have the manpower to replace losses. The bodies were just not there. After the Normandy campaign ended Montgomery had to disband one of his infantry divisions and use those men to bring the others back up to strength. This fact was one of the primary reasons the British leaned to set piece prepared attacks to minimize casualties. The shortage of manpower is also why some of Monty's attempts to break out of Normandy used so many tank units with far too little infantry support.
@@brucenorman8904 That sounds like a really reasonable intent, but did the actual casualty count reflect this being effective? What I mean is, by doing set piece, you're going to hit prepared defenders and that's going to cost a lot of lives. Or perhaps the British were trying to minimize loss by reducing number of engagements? If so, I could see that annoying US commanders who wanted to keep the pressure up, reducing overall loss, where British couldn't afford those short term losses. Anyway, sounds like an example of conflicting doctrine maybe being associated with individual personalities (Monty) where maybe it was really national interest for the British, and he took the blame for it? If so, interesting concept that I haven't heard before in my limited reading.
it was the opposite. Germans were the ones who constantly conducted counter attacks and counter thrusts, this historian is a known puppet. Germans lost the war by having close to 0 air support in the west while being severely outnumbered. They had to withdraw all the time to prevent being encircled. obviously you run out of space eventually. this is an exerpt from a washington post article from 1985: "The Germans were willing to act -- always," said the British Major- General Brian Wyldbore-Smith. They seldom failed to seize an opportunity offered by Allied error. They were masters of rapid counterattack after losing ground. They would hold a position to the last, then disengage masterfully. Not every German soldier was a superman, not every formation of equal high quality. After the Battle of the Bulge, for all intents and purposes the Wehrmacht's last gasp in the west, the western Allies never again faced German units of the highest caliber. But throughout 1944, amid the monumental errors of Germany's high command, at regimental level the German soldier achieved miracles.
@@mikeyp5929 That the quote is from a British general makes my point. British leadership seemed to emphasize waiting to have strong forces to resume the attack, while the Americans kept the pressure up. Other than the battle of the bulge, I don't believe there were any significant counter attacks against US forces in the west, because we kept the pressure up. Don't get me wrong, I've never read any account of the Germans being lousy during their defense..they had plenty of experience retreating from the Russians by then, and retreating is difficult. But by this point in the game they were outclassed in pretty much every respect, by everyone. The biggest mistake they made was starting the war in the first place.
I appreciate bringing such celebrities as Prof Neitzel as guests to your channel. Especially since my funds for books are somewhat limited during this pandemic. Very informative and nicely conducted podcast. :)
Prof. Neitzel’s pic was so High quality I was expecting a video interview, for him to start moving and taking,
Thought he'd got a second PhD in ventriloquism.
I loved how MHV finally pointed out the strategic advantages of the allied artillery emphasis. I always enjoy his videos on artillery because artillery is pretty "unpopular" with the popular military culture. Everyone just really likes to talk about tanks and aircraft. Artillery is not about the weapon itself (even though the experiences of troops with certain weapons (-systems) sure is interesting), but it's about the effect of artillery fire that determines it's capabilities. WWI artllery ordnance is outclassed by ordnance developed in the 1930-40s but using it effectively will make it less "obsolete" than people would think. Just look at finnish artillery in Sommer 1944. Finland for the most part used WWI ordnance but their effects were great in the defensive battles of Sommer 1944. I feel like I digressed too much.
Out of all major nations taking a part in the war, Americans had the best utilization of the artillery. They had virtually an endless supply of ammo. They could move their guns quickly due to the plentiful trucks and fuel. Most importantly, Americans developed the system to maximize speed, accuracy, and destructiveness of their artillery. For example, They had pre-computed firing data for a massive number of variations such as wind, temperature, barrel wear, and elevation differentials. And for each variation of firing data, there was a specific tape measure detailing how to conduct fire in those conditions. These measures greatly shortened the process time which allowed artillery crews responding to requests faster than other nations could. Also thanked to their effective system, U.S Artillery could performed Time On Target (TOT)/Fire Control which allowed all artillery guns in range of the target, regardless of distance to target or gun caliber, to land on the target at once. This vastly increases destructiveness of artillery barrage which would turned any German military formations fields of spilled viscera and mauled bodies. During the battle of Aachen, U.S Artillery played a crucial role in American victory. Their capability to fire indiscriminately with overwhelming amounts of artillery fire support repeatedly stopped German's determined counter-attacks.
I love how much detail is included in your videos.
Drink every time someone doesn’t watch the video first before stating their opinion.
My liver couldn’t take it
@@michaeldebellis4202 rip your liver
I love these people commenting with an explanation on a 26min long video within 8min of the video being released 🤣
I did at 0:07 so I think I win!
Yeah and dont even bother to watch to the end and just blabber all the nonsense that has been repeated all over again with no sound footing.
@@kleinerprinz99 I heard enough oh and read rise and fall of the third Reich. Why the German counter attacks failed? By 43 the technology gap was sufficiently bridge than the weight of numbers could overcome them. THIS was why france, Poland and large swaths of the western USSR fell because the technology gap was too wide. Poland, tanks weren't a priority calvary was. France, you had civilians in key positions of power more interested in not losing their position than fighting the germans the tech gap was alot smaller but bad french leaders, and good german commander's caused a cascade of failures. Russia, well the tech gap was small but the numbers weren't there in fuel, competent leaders, and material. When the got the numbers and a certain austrian corporal got STUPID germany was beaten. (Stalingrad broke the germans in the east) by the time the wehrmacht regrouped in late winter it was all but over USSR had the men, the mats, and the metal to brute force germany back. The western front, any battle hardened forces were there for R&R and again competent leadership was whole not lacking by a long shot the man in charge wasn't among that clické. By the time germany countered the tech gap was insufficient to surmount the numbers on the ground (though Caen stopped up Montie) the key point our tuber here wanted to get across is that it wasn't numbers alone but the tech gap had been closed so german "shock" wasn't nearly as potent. Yes I posted at 0:07 but I did watch it😱
@@brianjohnson5272 I appreciate your take on the matter, but to be fair, Prof. Neitzel and MHV provided a much more comprehensive, nuanced and layered view, thus (intellectually) more satisfying. E.g. When faced with any gap, such as artillery power, air dominance or just technology, Neitzel observed a Wehrmacht's reluctance, possibly inability to face the problem strategically and let alone implementing any structural adaptation. Technological superiority with the enemy is just a strategic problem that, as often has been proven in even recent history, can be handled successfully. E.g. Resorting to asymmetric warfare, night-time warfare, civilian meat-shielding, biochemical warfare, special operations/psy-ops warfare, disingenuous truce/cold war etc. Which in return each are merely strategic problems too. Just as technological superiority originally was the European powers' strategic answer to their numerical inferiority problem when colonising the world, technological inferiority is merely among the many strategic questions with multiple answers. Not applying any of those answers is the failure, having the problem is not. Not actually adapting one's strategies when faced with strategic problems is perhaps among a general's cardinal sins.
@@bosoerjadi2838 this whole heartedly admit. MHV and the prof go deeper. I wasn't trying for in depth I'm trying to break it down so the causal american historian can understand it. (Like a amateur chess player playing a Grandmaster) I am american and have nothing but contempt for American education which was inferior to my parents education because of "tasteful editing" of everything think "gloss over everything and hope they can do multi dimensional physics" and I also think in such an abstract way not even kin who've know me since my first cries understand my thought process. So I try to break down everything so even the 7 year old mentally can understand it. These guys don't filter it down enough and it hurts views and subs.
Prof Neitzel is very interesting to listen to! Thank you for bringing him to the channel.
I love having KITT teaching us about history. Feel a bit sorry he have replaced Hasselhoff, but I bet prof. Neitzel is a good Knightrider too
you dont know anything
Haha, I'd buy that for a Dollar!
The US Army brought a ton of firepower to the fight. In addition regular Armored Divisions, every single US infantry division was reinforced with an independent tank battalion and in many cases a tank destroyer battalion. The lowly German grunt would’ve killed to have a StuG permanently attached to his infantry division, let alone a tank.
this is a primary driver of operational method. The US simply declared industry on Japan and Germany. After all, why waste men if you can waste shells?
@@CB-vt3mx Tell that to the tankers who had to use Shermans against much better tanks. Or even worse, the 8th air force.
@@princeofcupspoc9073 If a nuclear bomb was a statement and people being the truth not only will you not kill a single person they won't even have radiation burns because on how utterly false that statement is.
@@princeofcupspoc9073 From what I remember the whole point of the sharman's was that they would have five for every "better" Axis tank they had to fight. Theoretically, the only way they could loose at that point was defeat in detail.
@@princeofcupspoc9073 100% false. US infantry suffered an 18% casualty rate while tankers only suffered a 1-2% casualty rate. The US Army Ballistic Research lab studied 3rd and 4th armored tank on tank engagements and found the M4 had a 3.6-1 kill ratio against the Panther. US tank destroyers had a 10-1 exchange rate. The M4 had already clearly surpassed the PzIV and Tigers were rare. Maybe the Panther was better at killing tanks, but it’s clear and obvious that US tankers were far better than German ones. Also because of the Sherman’s outstanding reliability the US is bringing a higher percentage of tanks to the fight meaning more firepower and fewer grunts are gonna die.
Love the channel. In this context "einzugraben" should be translated as "entrenched" or "dug-in" [as earlier and is, I believe, the preferred expression for artillery] rather than buried. "Buried" implies covered over with earth, as in a grave [rather than a trench]. Die Artillerie muss nicht begraben werden.
Yea, not every word from Google Translator is right
Could you do a video about how different armies would conduct an orderly retreat under fire and fought a rearguard? Considering its importance and difficulty I feel like the good old fashioned reverse advance is a very underappreciated maneuvre.
It's funny how so many only clicked on the video to reply to the title instead of watching it.
it's so annoying. people think things are much more simple than they really were, and we live in a society where everyone feels like they have to share their opinion on something no matter how uninformed they are.
Its unfortunate really that these types of people are the viewers of MHV
don't need to see the video. Oil, Rubber and 85% of your forces tied up by the CCCP. Done
Nothing to watch!
@@GuitarMan22 :facepalm:
Because Viggo Morgenstern bid us to "STAND MEN OF THE WEST!"
A more perfect comment there never was
@@buckeyebeliever3397 I ALMOST busted out the whole speech! lol.
A day may come when the courage of Men fails, when we forsake our friends and break all bonds of fellowship, but it is not this day.!
There is always hope..
Mortensen*
Wow. This is great. I like it when my conception s have been challenged. Thanks for this.
The terrain in the West is totally different than in the East. It's much tighter. The East is much more open. Dont send one Tiger to do what four Panzer IVs could do better.
Well said. In the West, the size and weight of the Tiger I and II were their biggest handicaps.
Greg's Airplanes points out that in the middle of '43 the Allies began planning for Overlord. On the basis of two other failed amphibious landings, they decided that air superiority was absolutely crucial. From this point on the target of Allied fighters was the Luftwaffe fighters. As a result, by the time of the Normandy landings the Luftwaffe in the West was practically non-existent. What was left had moved to the East. Where they could help and would live a lot longer. And just as in the Pacific, air superiority is critical.
doesnt matter, neither have any fuel anyway
I think most of this makes sense, but I think the real problem that happens with communication on a low level. No one ever moves during an arty barrage because you'll die, we all know this. However to get up and start moving is hard when you don't understand WHY you have to get up. Platoon level radios weren't very common for the germans, so even if your company was attacking and you lost sight and came under arty attack you would hide until it went away, then wait. The waiting isn't very logical or voluntary, it's an effect of psychology. Eg. You're a person who's deathly scared of dogs, you go into a yard to knock on a door and a pack of dogs attack you but you make it away. Now you're not going back into that yard unless you're reminded of a hell of a good reason to do so. This is also on top of understanding where other units are and having your own initiative which at this point allowed officers to make tactical choices. So your platoon commanders morale breaks not because he's weak willed but because he doesn't understand the situation anymore. He pushes slightly more and finds the enemy, what he's going to do now is send a messanger to findout what's happening with the other units because if they've already broken off he's not gonna lead his men into more arty. Having radios on the other hand solve this problem by instant communication. If you knew the platoon to your left was still engaged then you also would stay engaged until. At the very least to just take pressure off the units next to you. Even with PRR's (Personal Radio Receiver) we have now a days things get messy and confusing. It gets even more terrifying when you add 105mm explosions from the sky and you can't actually hear anything. Also talking about arty, you forget to mention that lots of planes actually had RP-3 rockets, which apparently broke morale for everyone on the ground, including tanks. One of these instances was actually Otto Carious commanding, if I can remember correctly, 4 jagdtigers who actually abandoned their tanks as soon planes flew over. It didn't even shoot at them. The reason I mention these rockets is that they had the explosive equivalent an arty strike all by themselves. Granted they would have to go back to rearm but just the idea to have that happen from planes apparently is enough to scare the brown right outta them!
Love your work MHV. The Batte of Long Tan is an example of a time when superior artillery was almost overcome. It may serve as an example of how valuable artillery support is because without it there would not have been a battle. I believe it also shows how well trained a unit of soldiers can be. There is an excellent documentary on KZhead which includes the radio calls from the Australian soldiers in the battle. The radio discipline of the soldiers under fire is remarkable.
Excellent presentation, as usual!
When he said US Cruiser "Boys" I was like, "What? Is this some WW2 Hip Hop group; the US Cruiser BOYZ!" But then I saw he simply pronounced Boise as "Boys" instead of "Boy-zee" and became extremely disappointed there was no USN hip hop group from exclusively cruisers called the "US Crew-zer Boyz!" I so want this to be true!
@@antoshq1985 AND BIGGA DAKKA ASWELL
USN had its own band. Very popular in its time. ' The Village People.'
Love love love the analysis of the effects of allied artillery superiority.
So cool you got Neizel to join you on this one.
Great presentation. Thank you for sharing with us. Please consider adding closed caption (CC). Best wishes for every success.
"We all know the field artillery won the war." That is a quote from Patton addressing a formation of soldiers shortly after hostilities. The German way was form a battlegroup from what was available and counterattack. The American way was to bring as much 8 inch, 155mm and 105mm howitzer fire to bear on the problem. And all it took was a junior officer with a radio, binoculars, and a map.
The Allies simply had too much stuff. That simple. Though it should be noted that while it took the Germans 6 weeks to take France, it took all that Allied 'stuff' six months to take it back.
"And all it took was a junior officer with a radio, binoculars, and a map" To destroy a monastery and the nearby village for no reason.
As Napoleon said "God favors the side with the superior artillery."
"the british did not learn maneuver warfare until the 1980's" *BUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUURRRRRRRRRRRRNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN*
#1776
When you're an island nation, it's just not top priority.
maybe if they'd listened to "Boney" Fuller..... Mind you Sir Arthur Harris was on to something when he said, the British Army would never adopt mobile warfare until the tanks could "eat hay and shit."
And that's why the British were win out in the end. God save the King! =P
I think it may be possible someone hasn't heard of Bill Slim... >sneaks half an army around the Japanese left flank, while fooling the Japanese commander into thinking it's still on his right. >400 mile flank-march through jungle around Japanese left. Remains undetected. A whole corps. Half his whole army. Has set up an entire fake corps radio net in their original position for the Japanese to listen in on, to convince them they are still there. It works (!). >accomplishes longest opposed river crossing in WW2 (Irrawaddy is 2km wide). Immediately establishes bridgehead. >uses two-thirds of a division to dash 80 miles from bridgehead to capture main Japanese supply base of Meiktila, nearly 100 miles behind Japanese frontline.Captures Meiktila in brutal 4 day assault against fanatical and suicidal Japanese resistance. Ignores flanks, ignores establishing a supply corridor. Relies entirely on air supply. >immediately uses captured Meiktila airfield for casevac and reinforcement and resupply. Then airlifts in the entire final brigade of the division into Meiktila, Slim having made it air-transportable by replacing jeep and artillery axles with narrower versions that fit on a Dakota. >Slim now has an entire division holding the main Japanese supply nodal point, 100 miles behind their front. Entirely supplied by air. >Kimura, Japanese commander, orders as many units as he can to go south and take back Meiktila. >Slim launches his northern corps into their own opposed river crossings of the Irrawaddy now that the units opposing them are weakened. All cross successfully. >Kimura abandons his plan for "The Battle of the Irrawaddy Shore" and tries to throw everything he has at Meiktila. Loses Mandalay , second biggest city in Burma, as a result. >Meiktila holds against everything they can throw at it. >Kimura breaks off siege and tries to retreat south. >14th Army pursuit is relentless and results in two ridiculous needle-thin salients reaching from Meiktila to 64km north of Rangoon - they build makeshift airfields every 50 miles to maintain air supply. They cover more than the distance between Paris and Luxembourg between 28th March and 25th April 1944 - in other words, a 4-week blitzkrieg that prevents any Japanese unit from recovering cohesion. Distance between launching point of offensive, Imphal, and it's final objective, Rangoon, capital of Burma, is 1177km. Distance between London and Rome: 1168km. Yes. Really. >majority of Japanese units now trapped west of the roads between Meiktila and Rangoon. Kimura decides he cannot hold Rangoon with the forces and supplies he has left, and chooses to retreat and not contest the capital of Burma. A Japanese commander in World War 2. Chose. To. Retreat. >remaining trapped Japanese forces are massacred trying to cross the road on which 14th Army is now dug-in during the monsoon. >ever after, Bill Slim is referred to as a master logistician and a consummate manoeuvrist general in most military histories. >in 2011, national poll names Bill Slim alongside Wellington as jointly, "the best generals Britain ever produced". >"British did not learn manouevre warfare until the 1980's..." >Me: ...?
FYI, "Boise" is pronounced BOY-see. It's a city in the northwest part of the USA. :)
Euh, not in particular. The origin of the name is in Boisé, meaning "wooded". Therefore the pronounciation may be also be "Buahs-eh", or should you ignore the accent, "Buahs". Although in the context of the US cruiser, the American version is preferable :)
Boise is the liberal gross part of Idaho. Panhandle Secession when?
also, best ship of WW2
*Boy-zee
When he said US Cruiser "Boys" I was like, "What? Is this some WW2 Hip Hop group; the US Cruiser BOYZ!" But then I saw he simply pronounced Boise as "Boys" instead of "Boy-zee" and became extremely disappointed there was no USN hip hop group from exclusively cruisers called the "US Crew-zer Boyz!" I so want this to be true!
Very good video. Is there any place to read about German and Soviet artillery duels during the war? I'm particularly interested in how effective Soviet counterbattery fire was, considering that the US and British Army could have collided with the Red Army, to compare how both would have tried to cancel each other is quite interesting.
Italian campaign was faultless,let me clarify. The fighting withdrawal campaign was.
Than why did they loose all of Italy? That was their plan from the beginning?
Kesselring was brilliant in drawing out the campaign and keeping allies bogged down for long periods allowing them only slow and costly limited advances, northern italy was still part of the German front at ve day, another commander less skilled and less mindful of terrain could have lost Italy much sooner and freed up those allied forces to push up into Austria tyrol Slovenia Croatia etc
@@steventhompson399 any way you try to slice it, Northern Italy is a terrible place to attack and an excellent place to defend. Kesselring was brilliant on a lot of levels, but he had a lot going in his favor too.
@@420JackG so did the allies have great great advantages. In materiel and tech they had no equals. I'd argue allied advantages mattered more and eventually led to their victory
@@jamescaan870 The Allies also had frankly bad commanders. Like thr guy who attacked Rome instead of punching through the defensive line, allowing the Germans to withdraw
"we all know about the atrocities of the Wehrmacht" damn a lot of people won't like hearing that lol
Hey! I left my 'Clean Wehrmacht' on the kitchen table next to my reading glasses. I think MHV took it from me. Not sure when he is going to return it. I watched TimeGhost's Pearl Harbor minute-by-minute thinking 'well TIK and MHV have overturned everything I know about this damn war, so maybe a few US battleships make it out, gather with the carriers, and counter attack.' Nope, Japanese still bomb, torpedo and strafe the manure out of everything. Manstein: Hitler was crazy and thus lost the battle of Pearl Harbor. 1st US General: What? 2nd US General: Shush, he is on a roll. Give him a book deal.
@@vladimpaler3498 are you having a stroke mate ?
@@vladimpaler3498 I'd be grateful if you could explain to me what you were trying to say. I'm afraid I don't follow entirely
yea and a lot of people won't like hearing all the fucked up shit the allies did too atrocity propaganda can go both ways
Yup found 'em
As always, very nice video.
Perfect Video! Please more!
I wonder how much of the Western Allies' artillery superiority was due to their vast superiority in Engineering equipment? It's a lot easier to emplace and displace artillery when you have bulldozers. I can't recall ever seeing a contemporary picture of a German dumptruck, let alone a bulldozer.
Wie geil. Du hast den Sönke als co-mod 😁 ich mag die dokus mit ihm
Ja ich auch !
I have seen Herr Neitzel on TV and in documentaries for a long time. I feel this guy is a very good modern analyst of WW2 and certainly from the German side of things.
Great video guys
Might we one day get a dedicated video on American and British artillery? I seem to recall seeing a quote from a German soldier saying something about how American artillery was the most effective of the war. It seems like people often give a lot of credit to the American air superiority, but perhaps their artillery superiority was as much or even more of a factor? It would be interesting to compare American artillery vs German, Russian, and British.
Over and over again the Germans mention British and American artillery as their best weapon.
The problem is (for the wehrmacht) that they where outguned and ad lost air superiority long ago even in the east ! When you have lost air superiority you loose any chance of being equal on artillery
@@richardschaffer5588 Yes, but it seems not to get the same kind of attention as the air force. I guess it's not as 'cool.' But I would like to see more analysis of the impact.
Air power. They had none. Correction Air power and seas power. But without Air power Sea power is very vulnerable.
They had an airforce. They lost it all.
The RAF and USAAF had thousands more planes and basically an unlimited supply of oil and fuel
@@stc3145 Yeah USA had almost all the world's supplies of oil at the time.
@@1986tessie No, Baku was the USSR's number one source, not the USA. There was also Persian oil available in large quantities, though getting it from there via the sea was not easy (Italy in the Med). Plus, there were fairly underused oil sources in Indonesia (Dutch East Indies), which is what Japan was after.
@@Jupiter__001_ yeah I know, but in comparison the USA had the lions share. Texas and California production was massive.
Simply excellent as always - thanks you - intelligent, balanced, factually based.
Why does noone ever watch and listen to the youtube video(s) first before regurgitating all the wrong myths and legends all over again and spitting it into the chat? So much knowledge and new findings to learn about! Thanks for this intriguing video. I think from all those various factors, some of them feed into one another and with proper willingness to adapt and use the knowledge some of the other factors could have been mitigated. It is strange to see that the allies in the east and west had learned their lessons while the Wehrmacht unlearned theirs.
yeah, ironically most people do; although there is a loud minority that is mostly there for commenting.
@@MilitaryHistoryVisualized Good to know. Thanks. That warms my heart
04:53 "Allies OP, bitte nerf!" Classic! 😂👍🏻
14:40 Counter-battery fire is hamstrung without air reconnaisance. Also, blitzkrieg is nearly impossible without at least local air superiority unless weather is cooperative, but even then it is too two-dimensional.
I would point out american time on target tactics (multiple artillery batteries in different areas firing to have the shells strike within seconds of each other) was pioneered in WW2. Also air recon was less than commonly used. They used a grid map and a time to fire quite a bit.
@@brianjohnson5272 The Germans also lacked walkie-talkie wireless. The most dangerous man on any WWII battlefield was a G.I. with one of those. (Side note: my uncle was in the artillery during Ardennes/Rhine '44, had some incredible stories).
@@terraflow__bryanburdo4547 The Germans DID have the equivalent of the walkie-talkie. It was the Torn Fu g. Unless you mean a handy talkie, in which case they were extremely short range, and short battery life. The Germans had a LOT of signals technology on the field.
@@terraflow__bryanburdo4547 I thank him for his sacrifice. I will point out the french/german tanks had almost that same thing. German tanks had radios and french didn't.
@@princeofcupspoc9073 Yeah that makes sense. I know that the Germans spent a lot of effort running wire (there is a funny story during the Bulge where the experienced lead SS guys were running wire and cutting allied wire as they went, and the noobs behind them just copied by cutting what was actually the wire their own guys just laid down!) I guess the U.S. just had the punch to make the system more deadly.
Mr Neitzel is a lot here now! Super!
Absolutely brilliant. Please give us more of these. I always prefered the big picture videos over platoon tactics etc.
I remember reading that the Japanese in the latter part of the Burma campaign, 1944/1945 also would hug the allied lines in order to negate the Allies superiority in Artillery and Air power. The tactic was very effective.
Worked well for the rebel fleet at the Battle of Endor
Professor Neitzel is not only a good historian he's a brilliant ventriloquist.
lol
@@MilitaryHistoryVisualized But seriously, did he not speak because he does not speak English? Was this video dubbed in other languages?
There was a mishap/misunderstanding during the video recording, this is his voice. On my second channel, you can see him talk, we did 4 interviews there. Here is one: kzhead.info/sun/l8mKcqmNeoFsmJE/bejne.html
I'm reading Anthony Saunders book on the Atlantic Wall ( again). Chapter 3 covers the defence of the French coast. The point he makes that is relevant to the video, is the difference between the operation of Kriegsmarine artillery and the Heer artillery. The Heer batteries were set up to shoot into predetermined zones using indirect fire with the aid of a forward OP and were simply not in the business of shooting at ships. The Kriegsmarine batteries at the water's edge where targets were acquired visually by a fire control post and engaged at the earliest opportunity.
Very good video congratulations!
The USS Boise is named after Boise, ID and FYI it is pronounced BOY-ZEE but I only correct because your video was awesome, I can understand a German speaker not knowing that one....
thank you, I think I made that error two times, the cruiser comes up every 2.5 years, hopefully next time I remember it.
@@MilitaryHistoryVisualized as a native to the area, it's not worth remembering how to pronounce. It's a one horse town
@@jp-sw5gz Not true, the mare just gave birth. Now we are a two horse town.
>Average Axis player in Steel Division: Normandy in a nutshell
Alternative title: NEIN! MY PANTHER AUSF G DESTROYED BY A 75MM SHERMAN? THAT IS IMPOSSIBLE! ALLIED BIAS!!!!
Highly interesting and recommended.
I like your videos!
There is some literature out there discussing why US artie was so effective in WW2. Some excerpts describe relative TOT. US 1 to 3 minutes. British and German 5 to 10 minutes. Soviet 30 minutes to never. I think it came down to a mathematical breakthrough by US, and good cartography.
Nahh, it's the 1918-era French artillery doctrine the Americans used - essentially, part of Methodical Battle is the method of pre-calculating the possible places you'll be required to fire. ... if you've done this before, you can look at a map and go 'The Doughboys will want us to fire on that crossroads, into those woods and onto *those* two hills. Start plotting 4, 6 and 12 gun fire missions from our current location to each of those, men'. And then when the Lieutenant goes 'We need fire on hill 462 and we need it now', the artillery turns to page 5, sets the guns and then hill 462 explodes.
@@ianwhitchurch864 Not correct. The Finns began developing improved artillery fire control, pre-war. The Americans teamed up with the Finns and the joint effort lead to a vastly improved fire control. This combined with expansive deployment of radios through all levels of American units. American fire control was so good that in a matter of minutes they could bring every single artillery tube in range on target. This system was shared with the UK and commonwealth. This allowed all Allied artillery tubes in range to be brought to bear. The American's also developed a tactic termed Final Protective Fire.
@@ianwhitchurch864 I think you need to read this to get a better understanding of artie. armyhistory.org/u-s-and-german-field-artillery-in-world-war-ii-a-comparison/
During the Battle of Berlin the Red army had 41,000 artilery tubes and heavy morters. With that sort of firepower chances are that one of them will hit the target reasonably qukckly!
@@firstlast7052 Reports I have seen out of Ukraine show Russian tank fire is fast and accurate. Turn on your stinger and you only have seconds before a tank round arrives.
The whole key to what is referred to in English as 'blitzkrieg' is combined arms. If you essentially have no air force, you can't really have the benefits of combined arms. It's like asking a one armed man to juggle. Not so good.
I bought the book, thanks to these videos.
Glad you like them!
Getting my CAT shirt soon. So excited!
27 seconds in and I’m already giving you a thumbs up 👍
I love the little comment explaining what OP means, but I think if that needs to be explained, an explanation for nerf would probably also be suitable :) (to make something weaker/less powerful)
Allied resources and industrial might were definitely OP. The Germans should have focused more on capturing the oil of the Caucasus instead of making a half hearted push for Moscow - this would have Nerfed the Soviets production and mobility advantage to Balance the Axis resource and mobility disadvantages. .
@@chriscox3460 I know you’re joking but the caucasus would have done nothing for the Germans
In KZhead, there are countless videos about small arms, infantry, battles but hardly any on artillery. The big guns are what the division was all about.
same with books, I did a few videos on artillery and the sources ran rather thin at least for WW2. I think for Napoleonic stuff there was quite a lot in relation to other arms.
@@MilitaryHistoryVisualized yeah its weird since when the artillery was introduced to the battlefield hundreds of years ago it was the defining factor and always king :)
You're all right ! Artillery even against Tanks is still the main weapon since Napoleon ! I Think we are just fetichist about propelled artillery or tanks ! so we forget about a factor of 10 between artillery and armored vehicule in WWII
I agree @ 21:40 I've heard of instances of night fighting by the Japanese in the face of us firepower in the Pacific war and wondered why germans didn't take it up when confronted by overwhelming artillery and airpower in the west, could have helped at least on a tactical level
Maybe because of the size of operations. Japanese late war generally attacked on a smaller scale against smaller areas. Attacking with a platoon or battalion it is easier to deploy at night and to stay in control then with a regiment or division. Which was necessary to dislodge the Allies. Not to mention many Japanese night attacks were banzai attacks so command and control was given up the moment the buggles started sound. Also armor does not work well at night. Even tank drivers of modern tanks have a hard time seeing the ground at night and not driving into a ditch. But night infiltration by the Germans did happen. But still got the problem that a single allied soldier with a working radio left in the line that was overrun at night (and thus easily missed) is able to call death from the sky at everybody he sees after day break.
And, the concept of concentrated fires, in coordinated Time on Target fire missions, from distributed firing positions, was developed by the US Army in the 1920’s and 1930’s. The American Army wrote the requirements for the FM radio based on these concepts. And were the first army equipped and trained to use mobile fire direction centers. The truth is, in the 1940’s, no army on earth could come close to the American Army’s ability to respond, almost instantaneously to a call for fire in support of almost any soldier requesting it. It was not just better radios, more guns, or more ammunition (although there was a lot of that). While the Germans get a lot of credit for their armor, few recognize the incredible integration of artillery into mobile operations pioneered, and mastered by the United States.
@darkplace28 I'd say every artillery gunner is biased and overemphasizes their own strategic and tactical value. I guess its normal behavior to be proud of ones division. In modern warfare there is no one aspect that will lead to victory but a combination of many factors including support by the population at home.
@darkplace28 Did not mean to give the impression the other nations were not capable, the Royal Artillery were (and still are) one of the finest forces, soldier for soldier, ever fielded, and have developed some remarkable innovations in artillery. Having said that, the US in the inter war years was much more aggressive in developing solutions for a series of command and control problems in the deployment of artillery than the Europeans. The Americans, more than any other country focused on rapid artillery response from dispersed moving columns of guns. The American’s became incredibly focused after the fall of France, as there was the realization the Axis forces (especially the Germans) were far ahead of our capabilities in maneuver, most notably in armor. We realized to counter highly mobile forces, with what we had at the time, was to maximize what we had developed in artillery command and control, and to speed up the deployment of what became the best mobile heavy howitzer of the war (imho), the 155mm Long Tom. The best of the European artillery branches were the Royal Artillery, and we took as much as we could from their experiences, but it was hard learning too much from those distances. So, the Americans had made significant leaps in developing command and control system theory to achieve concentrated effects from dispersed and moving batteries. The Brits had reinforced the necessity of it in the battles in France and in the desert. The patents for FM were developed under the requirements for the US Artillery by the Signal Corps in the 1920’s. The artillery system of systems, based on this revolutionary (at the time) capability (short range, 920 channel capable, capture effect, single channel radio transceivers) was much more capable of flexible targeting from mobile, distributed firing units to centralized and numerically dispersed targets than any other of the time. The British from 1939 through the end of 1942 were more practiced in combat operations using the basic concepts, just not equipped as well as the Americans were to actually execute it. The US began to equip its entire force, before entering into the war in Europe, with hundreds more radio communications systems per division than equivalent German or British divisions, and almost all of those radios were linked to layers of fire direction centers, command elements, scouts, etc, etc, etc. This network allowed for almost immediate calls for fire from virtually anywhere on the battlefield, and even moving batteries could be directed to stop, and set up for fire missions as fast as they could lay the guns. No other army in the war had that capability, although again, the British also had a very, very good capability and were more practiced until after Normandy. So, not talking about gunners, staff officers, commanders, or quality of batteries, battalions or brigades. The revolution was more in the speed, dissemination and computing power of the command and control network. While the British forces were moving in similar directions, the American system had more communications, faster response time and had the ability to consolidate fires across a Corps faster. The reason really was pretty simple. While British, French, German gunners, commanders, NCO’s and staff were as good (or in many cases better), the American system of systems approach had hundreds more radios per division, which enabled more active layers of FDC’s in the system if systems. Wee also learned from the Royal Artillery, and in 1940 it was hard for them to learn from us (they were kinda busy). For example, they began to use the Lysander dedicated observation aircraft for identifying targets and calling for fires, which greatly sped up their artillery response times, but those suffered incredibly high casualties, and then the switch was made to smaller and much slower aircraft. Those were so incredibly effective, the US adopted the capability, and our Army even began to search for color blind artillery observers (to spot camouflage systems from the air). As the war went on, the two services learned and traded equipment and ideas, and how to work in concert. The American howitzers (especially the 155mm Long Tom, which the Brits used to fill in a gap in their capability) were generally rated as good or in some cases better than British equivalents, while it is generally acknowledged the British high velocity flat shooting guns were superior to their American counterparts ( the 17 pounder, and what we adopted as our “57mm”, really had no American counterpart). In the end, if you were a German or Italian in 1943, 1944 or 1945, and were facing an American or British Division or Corps, you were in for a world of Artillery hurt.
I note that you don't list D'Este's book on Anzio in your reference list, but he notes the crude tactics of the big German counterattacks using contemporary descriptions of the German infantry tactics that is similar to the sort of descriptions of the mass of German infantry from the 1918 Kaiser offensive - clumping up, shambling masses, simple waves, apparent inebriation. In my view, the reasons the descriptions are similar for both 1943-45 and 1918 are because in both wars the German infantry were by then heavily depleted with the best ordinary infantry leaders, NCOs and soldiers long KIA, WIA, MIA or POW. The infantry had become an indifferent, defensive militia stiffened by the best men in crew served weapons roles and reliant on the panzers and elite units to provide counter attack forces. The inflexible tactics of the Red Army hid the scale of the decline, but when German infantry came up against the flexible, rapid, accurate and deadly artillery and air support of the western allies in the open they were shocked at its effectiveness and quickly the infantry war in the West became one of one side being a light infantry army relying on concealment and crew served infantry weapons vs a fully mechanised army with plenty of heavy weapons and ammunition and more that happy to take their time using massive sledgehammers to crack walnuts - coming out into the open to fight in those circumstances was like a Godsend to the Western Allies because increased effort simply resulted in heavier German casualties.
You should take some time to add up the enormous Allied losses in the west At the Huertgen forest for instance U.S. units broke and ran. It should be worht mentioning. B.t.w. I am in the U.S.. Marshall himself had to cross the Atlantic to find out what was happening. Remember, those were not German front line troops in the west. Just kids and old men.
@@thenevadadesertrat2713 that is complete nonsense. it was not "kids and old men" in 1943. further more Bloody US attacks in the Huertgen forest were not launched against superior artillery.
@@williamt.sherman9841 In that case Westmoreland should have been court martialed. He kept sending in troops to be chopped to pieces. He did the same in 'Nam. He received promotions instead and retired as a four star I believe. Him and McNamara cooked up that "idot" troops concept with GI's that had an IQ of less than 50. It was called McNamaras idiots if I recall.
Nice story, this is why the allies won, almost everything they did, they did better; they won the war with relatively light casualties.
In Balck's memoires he lauds the idle divisions sitting in Northern Italy and slow movement of the reinforcing PZ korps, and (unusually) blame the friction between Rommel and Smiling Albert as well as Hitler's slow release of that PZ Korps for reinforcement while his soldiers needed it.
Maybe time was a factor, also. If I remember they had a big break after Poland and another after France to do the big assessments, discussions, training and organizational changes that took time to implement. Perhaps they just never got the downtime to do another after Barbarossa and all the attendant casualties.
That was very interesting. Though, most of the points he makes can be attributed to logistics or attrition. By 1943 the German army was crumbling and it is not surprising that a crumbling army cannot effectively assault. It is definitely a topic worth debating but I don’t think he’s made any new discovery.
The German High Command did not have a lack of Caviar or Champagner and despite Attempts at Hitlers life they also did not suffer attrition. Its the failing of the Werhmacht Higher command structures to adapt and learn their lessons and actually unlearning lessons of the past. Its a strategic and intellectual failing. Didn't you watch the video to the end?
@@kleinerprinz99 sometimes effects can be confused for causes. A Nation after years of continuous war can deplete valuable resources. It is difficult for me to believe a serious student of WW2 wrote the statement "(Germany) did not suffer attrition." Prior to a state of war between Germany and Russia, Germany was importing food and fuel to survive as a Nation in the face of Western embargoes while waging war. The German Nation-State was in a spiral of depletion while the war was taking place. Less-able, poorly trained, ill-fed, inexperienced troops cannot be expected to perform at the same level as 1939 troops.
Crumbling, how? 1943 saw massive INCREASES in war production, going into 1944. Industry did not collapse until the factories were actually captured by Soviet and US land forces.
@@princeofcupspoc9073 that does not negate the fact people were starving and truck/tanks/planes sat idle for lack of fuel. You can't eat coal or move iron with factories.
Srsly there are many good videos on this channel that detail the effects of attrition, let alone the general. The conscription of children and other "volks" weapon programs at the end speak for themselves, not to mention starting to run out of gas past 43.
One element I am kinda missing in this. If you look at basic production statistics, you will notice that in 1943 and especially 1944, the production of the more common 10,5cm LeFH 18 and 18/40, Pak 40 and 15cm sFH 18 increases significantly. In 1944 alone some 7827 10,5cm LeFH 18/40 where produced. That is slightly more than all the 10,5cm LeFH 18 and 18/40s produced than in 1939-1943 combined. Other weapons like the 15 or 21cm nebelwefers or the 10,5cm K18 also show large increases in production numbers. The last one out ranging most US, British or Soviet artillery pieces and making it on paper quite a good fit for counter battery fire usage. To me this all is remarkable. Not so much unexpected because British and US artillery was clearly something special and they had a lot more time to build up large numbers of artillery pieces. But the failure to adapt would be remarkable. Even with the very heavy losses sustained in 1944, you would expect the Germans to increase overall artillery numbers or at least make up for losses with this seriously increased rate of production. It seems that effective employment of such resources might have been a far more serious problem than you would expect. Kinda ironic seeing as the Germans in WW1 had quite an artillery park and seems to have known how to use it on multiple occasions with the results to show for it. Finally the Germans do seem to have one period of 1944 where their artillery really seems to have had some form of an impact. That would be the autumn of 1944 with the fighting in Lorraine. Way too late for anything other than extending WO2 in Europe, but still.
Production numbers alone are worthless. What's important is force ratios. In 1944, there was more allied guns deployed per german gun than in 1943. 1943 was worse for the Germans than 1942, and 1942 was worse than 1941.
Read the title and listen to the intro. This video is specifically about The German Army mindset and strategic failures in the West on an intellectual level. MHV has lots of other videos which focus on logistics or production or tactics etc :)
Is there a source for field gun (anti-tank or anti-infantry) production in WW2? I’ve been looking for one for a while
I think the battle of Ortona might be worth a look for this topic
I must ask having watch the series of videos with Professor Neitzel, will his book be produced in English, if so when please?
Sir Arthur Harris was on to something when he said, the British Army would never adopt mobile warfare until the tanks could "eat hay and shit."
On this, as he is on everything else, Bomber Harris is wrong. XXX Corps went from the Seine to Belgium faster in late summer of 1944 than the German Army did the trip in the opposite direction in 1940.
He also neglects to fathom that the German Army was predominantly Horse driven and it was the Americans and British who were far more motorised and mechanised. Besides Harris was a narrow minded self absorbed butcher with no inclination to cooperation with any other service, he thought bombers could win wars on their own.
The British used mobility in different ways with a focus on raiding and logistics until forces could be built up to levels where the application of overwhelming force could be decisive. The general approach in north Africa being to Scout, Disrupt, Probe, Prepare and then use a superior force to take strategic objectives. This had its strengths and weaknesses and undoubtedly Rommel was more agile but Auchinleck and then Montgomery both undertook mobile warfare - just in a slower and more methodical way
Artillery is known as the "queen of battle" and from a broad perspective, it is easy to see how the side with a significant advantage in artillery, would dominate the field of battle. This fact is just compounded by the fact that the Allies also dominated in the sky. With those two advantages, there isn't much of a chance for ground forces, in the defensive or the offensive capacity. Particular to the German side in World War II, is the factor of conceit or overconfidence. Liddel Hart points out in a couple of his books how the German conquest of France taking only 40 days did the Allies a great favor. It let Hitler think he understood and was a master of tactics and strategy and he would believe this until the end of the war. It also led many German officers to think that they were fielding the best military forces in this war and couldn't be stopped. They destroyed France so easily and were able to roll over every opponent until the Soviet counterattack, so the German leadership, until fairly late in the war believed they were superior. Overconfidence, particularly by Herman Goering, is one of biggest factors in their loss in the Battle of Britian and that destroyed their air force's capacity for the rest of the war.
FYI, it's King... Arty is the King of the battlefield not the queen... But with modern gender role confusion it is understandable...lol...
Interesting. I think the density of allied air power was a key. The active areas of Europe were quite small by comparison. It was in effect an early warning system .. any attack equals movement and preparation. This would be recognized quickly.. so day attacks were usually quickly identified. As you state.. Night attacks were not frequent . Maybe bad weather was the best time for German attacks. I also wonder about the later release of fighters to roam free and find their own targets. This must have been more than just an inconvenience . I have read a number of German memories on both fronts. It is interesting that airpower is the big fear on the Western Front and tanks, numbers of infantry and the powerful but slow to set up Russian Artillery on the Eastern Front. Thanks for a thoughtful topic.
One of your best videos for awhile. All too often people just talk about an overwhelming abudance of resources on the Allied side and does not focus on the Allied command and control systems with respect to artillery. Do you think that there is also a factor that experience of those soldiers who fought mainlyt the western allies were ignored??
Because they had everything on the east 🤣
Not entirely wrong, lol
That's true 👍 💯
No but like 70 % yes
Cuz Russia lol
And failing there too lol
Germany wasn’t mechanized enough to fully support a full counterattack against the western allies. Heavy reliance on fast moving panzer units left infantry behind. Horses were still heavily used. Much of the complaints with France’s army were comparable to Germany’s own industry.
That did not hinder the soviets and obviously you did not watch the video fully. MHV explains the situation clearly. No amount of mechanization would have helped if you do not have an answer for focused artillery fire. More material would have just meant more useless steel being shot to pieces. It was a war of attrition and no maneuver war anymore. Back to the drawing board.
@@kleinerprinz99 The Western allies were fully mechanized, and that allowed quick reaction times to respond to German counter attacks. Russia could rely on the sheer size of the frontline and the inevitability that the Germans did not have enough men to fully patrol areas. Plus the Soviets were fighting on home ground for the early war, and by 1943 had begun to push Germany back since their factories had returned to functionality. Air raids over Germany severely hindered attempts at mechanization of infantry support and led to an over-reliance on armored divisions.
Are there any plans for an English edition of Prof Neitzel's book 'Deutsche Krieger'? For a military history geek it looks pretty interesting. (I couldn't see one on Amazon)
Very interesting analysis ! Even if I was aware of some of the facts pointed here, I didn't came to this conclusion ! Thanks for this vid ! But This also lead me to rethink the batle of Bir-Hakein were a few "free french" dug themselves on a flat ground and stoped Rommel for 15 days. Talk about adaptability ! And the british who werent able to win the movement war did the same at El'-Alamein on a greater scale !
Good video. The technical and logistic accomplishments of US artillery in WW-2 are often overlooked.
"Hugging the enemy" Sort of a forerunner to General Giap's doctrine in Vietnam "Grab them by their belts."
The Soviets advised the Vietnamese
Giap didn't come up with anything. He had Chicom and Soviet advisors directing his moves. By 1968 he was out of favor with the communist brass and later on humiliated by being made "Head of family planning" despite having zero ob-gyn background. To be fair, he had zero military education either so both fields were even. There was a vietnamese poem on it: "Ngày xưa đại tướng cầm quân Ngày nay đại tướng cầm quần chị em" "Ngày xưa đại tướng công đồn Ngày nay đại tướng công lồn chị em" Translation: "Back then the general held (same world as command in vietnamese) troops Now he holds women's panties" "Back then the general sieged forts Now he sieges vaginas"
Will Sönke(never seen that given name before) Neitzels book be translated to English? Could be interesting, as its scope is larger than just WWII.
there is something in the works
Intersting topic and perspectives in this video :). One thing came to my mind: What about Operation Market Garden? Was the Wehrmacht able to hold the advance since the Allies were in the need of a rapid attack and linking up with the paratroopers? Certainly the situation is different then in Normandy and Italy ;).
Before I see the video my guess would be lack of air cover, especially in Africa and Europe 😊
Rommel warned the high command about allied air power, that once the invasion started moving forces for counterattacks would be too costly. But they did not listen, not having experienced such overwhelming tactical air power. They thought him overly cautious for wanting his armor reserves close to the front. What the high command failed to grasp was that the strength of the Allied war machine was their air power!!
Even it was that, Allied forces still have naval ships can bombarded Panzers as well. It makes nearly impossible to defeat Allied forces if they have clear air and naval dominance.
Which makes it all the more amazing what the Wehrmacht achieved with no aerial cover
@@joespeciale5875 What, losing? Lol
aight the detail is just amazing how do you find this info?
"Hugging the Enemy", in Vietnam 🇻🇳 this was used also by the NVA an guerilla fighters. Which was used along side underground tunnel systems became very successful in the heavely forested and highland mountain terrain of Vietnam.
"Anyone who has to fight, even with the most modern weapons, against an enemy in complete command of the air, fights like a savage against modern European troops, under the same handicaps and with the same chance of success." Rommel.
Why they failed? Germany was at war with the whole world. Thats why!
So true, they were brave fighting almost alone while other countries were lame to stick together.
And lack of oil
plus under non stop carpet bombing and still they kicked arse !
Most allied countries didnt send troops
@@nstl440 More like they were stupid fighting almost alone while other countries were smart to stick together. Giving your life away so that your country can starve and be bombed longer is not brave. Its stupid.
Part of Counter-Battery is Air Superiority/Control. If you don't have control of the air, you don't have Aerial Observation. This is ONLY a part of effective Counter-Battery fire, it is an important part. The Auditory detectors worked, but not as well as visual identification & radio communication. And if you don't have Artillery Dominance, you have reduced impact from ground operations.
Wasn't Mr. Neitzel in the documentary 'The Greatest Events of World War 2 in colour'?
Simple oil. My tank is out of petrol. No gas no go.
It's good that tanks don't run on bullshit and propaganda! We'd all be speaking german now if the did.
Wow, so simple. How did the historians miss it! (Rolling Eyes). The defense in the West required railroads and horses, which the Germans had. Fuel only becomes a critical issue for offensive operations, e.g. Watch on the Rhine.
Or Russian.
@@roskcity I'm no so sure, after all Stalin purged his ranks of competency after german surrendered.
@@princeofcupspoc9073 oil/bad logistics has become the stupid person's new WW2 argument. give them a 30min tactical or strategic analysis of specific scenarios and all they'll do is parrot "oil bro", "bad logistics". yes, we all know the Germans had logistical and oil shortage problems, now stfu and listen to what the experts are saying on an unrelated subject.
A question for Bernhard and Professor Neitzel: could some of the difference between what the Wehrmacht did on the Eastern and Western Fronts arise from different attitudes they held towards their respective enemies? In other words, could the indoctrination they went through have created a different psychology in all the ranks, from the _soldat_ to the _Generalfeldmarschall?_
I think this is a good question, even though my own answer would be that the differences that led to defeat or victory were not ideological ones. The Germans were determined to sweep the Allies back off the invasion beaches for instance if Meyer is quoted correctly. but perhaps the factors that made them lose in the west were not the same factors that lost them the war in the east. The only genuine factor I can think of is that surrender on the western front was thinkable, but trying to surrender on the eastern front ... I am not sure how much difference this made to outcomes but again, it's a good question.
@M. J. Explain why entire units in the spring of 1945 scrambled to surrender to American and Commonwealth forces at the close of the war? All German forces were taught that Slavs were subhuman. It follows then that losing to Russian forces would be considered humiliating, and ideological differences made surrender to the Red Army terrifying. The racial theories were pure nonsense, but they weren’t entirely wrong to not wish to be captured by the Soviets.
@M. J. I do agree - all sides tried to do it. The interesting thing for me is how varied the results were, and I think it would be fair to say that Nazi attitudes towards the peoples in the east was somewhat different to attitudes and behaviours in the west (most of the time), and this showed in how their soldiers fought. But I don't think it won or lost Ger,any many battles.
@@blacksmith67 "All German forces were taught that Slavs were subhuman" LOL no. Not true at all outside of Hollywood propaganda. Show citation or just shut up. They surrendered west because the soviet troops were raping and murdering as they went. Of course America did its fair share of raping too but thats a different story in a different context.
@@StratMan9009 generalplan ost?
"Hugging the enemy" is also used in post war. In order to keep enemy from using tactical nuclear weapons, Battle contact is tried to be kept at all times. So if the enemy suddenly move retreat, one must follow.
id like to bring up this small fact there's also the issue of lack of radio communication between the engaging forces and the leadership where as Americans and soviets had radios accessible by the infantry from both tank coms being relayed from infantry outside the tanks and having every sergeant, commandant with a radio directly calling info the Wehrmacht did not have the same kind of communications
The Soviets did not, once the war started most Soviet tanks were built with NO radio they had to use flags and hand signals. This was one of the reason why Soviet tank units continued to suffer high losses against German anti-tank capable units to the end of the war. In the early 1980s we were trained to identify Soviet command tanks by the antennas, at that time all soviet tanks had radios but only the command tank had a transceiver the others had receivers only. we were supposed to always try and take out the command tank first. If I recall correctly a soviet tank platoon was 3 vehicles a company 9 only the company commanders tank had the two-way radio the other 9 could receive only.
@@brucenorman8904 exactly good sir you can not compare the insanity that was ww2 adof to the rest of us with radios going put it right here thank god its pre forward observers cause if we brought them in closer it would just kill them im sorry i wasnt sure if my mind was right 13foxtrot would have died if we called for bring it in closer
i cant mention how many times as a 13b had to check fire cause the 13f were in the aoe
the men who died i forever have on my conscience
Stymied is pronounced as stigh-meehd (or as a German: stai-mied).
Guys a Tipp before playing the Armchair General: Watch the Whole video 😉
Guys a Tipp before trying to be smartass: try not to repost ;)
@@DjAkho guys a tip before trying to make me look like a Wannabe: I didn’t read many comments before posting so you can gladly stfu ;)
When you read 'Verlorene Kriege' by Von Mannstein, you see another issue namely that there were too many objectived at once.
In Rudolf Bohmler's book about the battle of Monte Cassino I came across a quote from general Wesphal about why exactly did Germans fail in pushing the allies back in the sea at Anzio. After giving several reasons (allied air and artillery superiority, concentration of troops which proved disadvantageous etc.) he pretty much summed it up with: "Our strength was no longer adequate; we were not capable of aggressive action.'' Obviously several years of war took their toll on the quality in the German army.