Why is Combined Arms so difficult?
Why is Combined Arms Warfare (CAW) so difficult? For this I talk to the officer and historian Lieutenant Colonel Dr. Tom Simoens from the Royal Military Academy in Brussels. Be aware that the views expressed in this interview don’t represent the views of the Belgian Armed Forces.
If you are interested in his work, be sure to check out his article about Combined Arms in the Defence Horizon Journal, check it out here:
Check out his article: www.thedefencehorizon.org/pos...
Cover images modified by vonKickass, Cover Images:
M109, Sir kiss, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons.
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M1 Abrams by Cpl Tyler L. Main, Marines from 4th Tank Division, Twentynine Palms, Calif., roll down a dirt road on their M1A1 Abrams Main Battle Tank during a day of training at Exercise Africa Lion 2012. License Public Domain: www.flickr.com/photos/dinfos_... Modification by MHV: horizontal flip.
Infantry Soldier [Image 6 of 6], by CPT Stephanie Snyder. The appearance of U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) visual information does not imply or constitute DoD endorsement.
Check out his article: www.thedefencehorizon.org/pos...
Follow Dr. Simoeons here: / tomsimoens137
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00:00 Intro
00:31 Definition Combined Arms Warfare
02:05 Why it is so difficult
04:50 No Combined Arms by the Russians in Ukraine?
12:15 Rivalry between Arms
20:12 Russo-Ukraine War
28:40 Mission Command
#CombinedArmsWarfare #CombinedArms #ukrainewar
It's expensive, complicated, depends on high levels of equipment and training. It needs the conductor and all of the musicians to be both able and able to work together. Historically great generals and admirals have usually been those able to best use as much of combined arms and logistics as had been developed at their times.
one more thing i recently read - for combined warfare you need people who can think and act independently - which is the perfect breeding ground for revolutionaries who might topple a dictator... So unless youre a democracy, its a balance of "get a good army which endangers my position as the leader" or "get an army which is worse but where the danger of revolution is severly decreased"
@@peka2478 Not every democracy is strong enough to prevent a coup de etat either. 🤺🤷😉
@@peka2478The Germans in WW2 were the best at combined arms, yet they were not a democracy at all.
@@Prometheus7272yeah and the number of assassination attempts on the dictator was also considerable, and higher than what most opt for, today..
So the views of the video totally represent the views of the Belgian Armed Forces, the Austrian Military, NATO, the Pentagon, every tank museum on earth, and my sergeant. Got it.
Back to the store remf
The point about Waterloo reminds me of battles from at least the Punic Wars to the English Civil War where Army A's cavalry crushes Army X's cavalry, but then A's cavalry leaves the field for pursuit or looting related reasons, and then X's infantry defeat's A's infantry and wins the battle. The 'insult to injury' variant is when some of the 'defeated' cavalry returns and helps their infantry seal the win while the 'victorious' cavalry is heaven only knows where.
Heaven knows where would be in the midst of the enemy baggage train. Or down in the pubs in the nearest town. The key to Cromwell's success was training his cavalry to rally after a successful charge. And for combined arms at Waterloo, the French cavalry failed to take infantry with them when they charged the English squares. The infantry had the job of spiking the cannons because some amongst them carried nails and hammers, but the cavalry never came prepared for that option. Napoleon abused Ney on the field for this oversight.
Stuart’s cavalry independent action may have caused lee to loose Gettysburg
I forgot which battle it was exactly, perhaps somewhere during the second Punic War, but there a few infantry units of the Romans managed to push through and defeated the units in front of them and, believing they had won the day, kept walking forward to the nearest town instead of turning back and attacking the enemy from behind, only to hear afterwards that the rest of their army got destroyed.
@@Lttlemoi Sounds like King Charles I's cavalry. I would note that the New Model Army featured the introduction of Roman Army drilling into the force. The Dutch were the first to do this, but Gustavus Adolphus was also into such things. The ones that missed the boat, so to speak, were the Spanish. If you don't have a copy on hand, I very much recommend the four volumes on the art of war by Hans Delbruck. I view him as pretty much the German equivalent of Gibbon, just more focused on military history.
The US Army's National Training Center, allowed Brigade-sized manuver battles, both MILES and live fire for statside manuever units starting in the early 1980s. I myself deployed there five times, as a tank driver, gunner, Platoon Leader (after OCS), Scout Platoon Leader and as an dismounted OPFOR platoon leader against rotating Blue forces - a full month each time. By 1991, while I didnt go to Desert Storm, my contemporaries and I had 50-60 full Brigade-sized battles to draw on as Captains. Many NCOs at the ten-year mark of service had even more, not only in combat arms but service support and combat support branches. This training IMHO, way the key difference between US and Iraqi forces in that conflict. It wasnt the weapons or technology. It was the skill level and training in large scale manuvers.
At around that time, my NG unit was activated to go to NTC to supplement the OPFOR. About a third of the OPFOR was sent to Suadi ARabia for Desert Shield since they were the best trained AND acclimated desert fighters we had at the time. I got to drive a MT-LB as part of an OPFOR mechanized unit. The rest of my unit manned teh trenches. Not only did I get to drive a Soviet tracked vehicle, I got to sleep in a vehicle instead of the trenches and it got cooold at night. LOL
NTC sucks to have to do a rotation at, unless you get to play OPFOR then it's one of the most fun rotations in the military. At least for Combat Arms, it's like summer camp.
Yeah, but don't try to explain it to "Gamechanger!", "give Ukraine F-16/F-22/Imperial Star Destroyer" crowd.
@@piotrd.4850 The HIMARS was a game changer, though. It gave the Ukranians an entirely new capability, while it denied the Russians a previously exploited comfort in their logistics. It can be argued quite convincingly that HIMARS made the Kharkiv & Kherson offensives last year a reality as opposed to a wasteful or pyrrhic maneuver. That said... while I don't think Ukraine should be getting f22s, the f16 will give the Ukrainians a new capability in SEAD & cruise missile operations, while denying the Russians a comfort they've been exploiting. Because right now, the Ukranians are receiving top-notch training, only to be let down by the aeronautical & electronic limitations of their aircraft. Like, they can't just use the anti-radiation missiles being supplied because their Soviet planes can't talk to the NATO missiles. So the missiles have to be told about their role by a guy on the ground with a laptop & a wire. These are *supposed* to be multi role munitions, but because if technological hurdles, pod space is wasted while sortie potential is severely hampered. Like, it's so bad that pilots are coming back from active fighting with missiles because the missiles can't be told to change according to what circumstances demand. If they could... it'd be a gamechanger.
@@TrollOfReason They weren't. No such thing exist. Ukraine had more than enough artillery and domestich Wilcha system with better parameters than GMLRS. What they lacked was COMPLETE SYSTEM - INTEL, RECCON and TIMELY TARGETTING for ordnance. Typical bane of armed forces since battle of Jutland and eastern in particular.
It sounds like you have this problem when you play StarCraft, especially as Terran. You have to keep siege tanks, marines, medic, SCV (yes, construction vehicles are very important in combat), banshee (CAS), vikings (air superiority) together in formation. They all move at different speeds, and each can die quickly if others are not around to support. They do tend to wander around, so you have constantly micromanage their movements. But if all units are all in their proper places, it’s a beautiful thing to behold.
Yup, as a protoss player that has beem creamed by a terran player good at this, it is quite terrfying at thw receiving end.
I actually had a discussion about StarCraft with a buddy of mine in regards to this. I was more or less talking about the Terran vs. Terran matchup, and how important the air dominance is and yet, you need to balance out AND position your armies in a way that they cover the other units to use them effectively. I found it interesting that despite how unrealistic the game is, there's still that aspect of the game that has some real world parallels. The air controls the vision, the vision gives the tanks the range advantage, the marines help control fight and take objectives. It's not 1:1 real, but the dynamics are present at some level.
I like DOTA 2 in part because it simulates well (or at least, brings to my mind) the 'gather resources scattered, fight concentrated' philosophy that gained ground since Napoleonic War. And you have to do it by communicating (often haphazardly) with 4 other players on your team. With lacking communication similarity of doctrine matters a lot (basically skill level, but this isn't exact; e.g. some carry players like to "farm" longer, while others join fights immediately). I think it even simulates the OODA loop quite well, since there are cool-downs on powers, re-spawns, etc., so timing concentration, and picking locations where to fight, is very important. Obviously, with so many different heroes and combos the variability is higher than in military flavor games, but in essence, it's all there.
The principles in Starcraft are all right. What I hate about it is the micromanaging and the fast game speed. In real warfare you don't micromanage individual soldiers or tanks. You delegate instructions and let them deal with the problem.
ayo micro is hard af - Clausewitz probably
Combined arms warfare is good for you
Combined arms warfare is good for me
combined arms warfare is good for me
Based.
There is no war im ba sing sei
A combined arms warfare a day will keep the doctor away.
I like a German description of Bewegungskrieg as being more similar to a jazz improvisation than an orchestra. The musicians must adapt and be flexible at all times.
Bewegungskrieg was related to combined arms as you indicate and jass is a good anology, but it was more a methodology of mobile warfare than combined arms. Many feel the principal came from Blücher’s operation in 1813-14, which in turn was based on napoleons operational tactics used in 1800-08. In very simple terms it was "git thar fustest with the mostest", which I think was a US 1860’s doctrine erroneously attributed to Forrest. Kampfgruppen was closer to the combined operations idea, or in US doctrine terms, the Combined Command doctrine, used in the light armoured divisions from 1943-45.
@@peterfmodel well, there are various terms like blitzkrieg, (WW2 media) auftragstaktik (US pidgin German) and the period fuhren durch auftrag, (which is now a postal term ironically) take your pick. I'm not going to split hairs over it.
@@martinsmith9054 well, his comment is worth listening: Indeed, Bewegungskrieg doesnt have the same meaning as combined warfare.
Using the analogy of an orchestra is simply a great way to get the idea across. I will be remembering this one.
I would say it’s a poor one. What battle is scripted like sheet music? It’s more like when jazz musician do improvisation.
@@paulthiessen6444 An orchestra of jazz musicians?
It is also used to describe carrier operations. I have used the analogy to try and describe the PLAN carriers. They may have teh carriers, teh ships and the planes, but getting those are the easiest components of carrier operations and doctrine. What takes longer, the craft of all the musical instruments (to professional standards) in a symphony or the training of all the musicians and then getting them to play as a symphony?
Monash said it in 1919.
@@geraldfreibrun3041 You know, there actually is a type of jazz called orchestral jazz. Though most people would likely just call it "big band" jazz (more properly you could call it a subset of big band jazz, basically what gave rise to what we generally call big band today as well as being a style that actively incorporates the stylings/structure/etc. of European classical). Think Count Basie, Duke Ellington. Whether or not any one big band with "orchestra" in their name is actually orchestral jazz is a different matter though. Also, I saw the USAF band years back and they broke into some jazz. They must have had 40 or so people minimum.
its hard because you have to train your infantry, artillery, and armor, then train the infantry to work with the artillery, the artillery with the tanks, the tanks with the infantry, then you need to train all 3 to work together, and that's a gross simplification
and then you have engineers, air support, and more.
And the logistics training....
Add air and transportation
Combined example. Intelligence finds the target, electronic warfare jams enemy drones, while friendly drones are allowed to correct artillery. Artillery fires to suppress defensive positions then switches to counter battery fire to protect advancing artillery. The armored vehicles suppress enemy positions while infantry advances. This all happens simultaneously to ensure the adversary cannot do anything other than become fixed and unable to respond.
not really. combined arms is when infantry, tanks, artillery, air support, engineers, etc. simultaneously attack a single target in a proscribed and well timed manner to capitalize on all the strengths of each respective combat element. Being able to have units of completely different skills and combat capabilities, strengths and weaknesses, joint o attack a single objective in teh best way possible. An infantryman typically doesn't know much about how to be a tanker, and vice versa. A typical pilot doesn't know much about mine clearing and vice versa. A typical artilleryman doesn't know much about Urban Breaching, and vice versa. Some people in charge of each fighting element needs to have a working understanding of what the other elements do, and what aspects of the battle are critical to them, in comparison to their own element. Intelligence happens well in advance of a combined arms operation. Jamming is often going on continuously before during and after, and many elements have their own jamming native to their individual elements. Drones spotting artillery fire is part of the artillery operation in general. Counterbattery fire is not a combined arms thing, as combined arms is offensive, and counter battery fire is defensive. Combined arms coordinates its attacks to strike the enemy targets and not letting them get of their ideal shots. If anyone is going to attempt counter battery fire, it's the enemy you're attacking with combined arms. But if you execute a real combined arms assault successfully, they'll never get to counterfire. A better example is the artillery fires first, and walks forward as the infantry are moving into range before teh artillery even finishes firing, while the armored elements move up to support the infantry. All the while helicopters and fighters are on call to bring the heat as needed, or to strike specific enemy targets deeper behind the lines to prevent a coordinated counterattack (hitting command and control, lines of communication, bridges to cutoff reinforcements, providing air cover, etc.). Also, the engineers might move in as well to establish a needed bridgehead across a river or piece of terrain that is enroute to the objective, all while the tanks, infantry, artillery, etc. provide cover to them. Maybe even an air assault element that strikes specific target buildings once the ground elements reach a certain point in the attack. and if executed correctly, from start to finish the whole thing might last less than 1hour, or maybe take a few hours to secure all objectives.
football, baseball, golf, bowling, and tennis are difficult. Combine Arms Warfare is an art form that is based on mastering a set of "sciences". Combined arms warfare is is about synchronizing the activities of multiple activities by multiple organizations across multiple domains. The theory is by far easier than the practice as it requires the commander to be able visualize everything at once, and for the staff to be able to visualize everything as well, but also across time. Only doing it in challenging exercises creates this ability.
You hit on a key Russian weakness: staff work.
Everyone who has ever had a group project in school knows why. Getting a few different people to successfully cooperate is maddening. And once you add in they all have different roles, combined arms is like a symphony.
The Canadian attack at Vimy Ridge during WW1 is a good example of a rolling barrage. Artillery advanced and the infantry followed so as to arrive at the enemy trenches immediately behind the wave of destruction.
Creeping barrage is what it was called when I went to school
Well executed by the Canadians... the French were also doing it a year earlier.
@@paulthiessen6444 I think that creeping barrage is something different - gradual queueing on target, done by British artillery in WW II and even shown in "Bridge Too Far". Americans had different approach. In creeping barrage you aim to converge on target with help of observers; rolling is just this - rolling.
I would say that at Waterloo there was a substantial element of combined arms early on by the Allied command under Wellington with artillery and the Rifle regiments being used in support and inflicting heavy casualties. However the quality of guns and munitions at the time did not allow for rolling barrages. Even going back as far as Alexander cooperative use of infantry and cavalry was a mark of the more able military.
Indeed. Just like in history of codified martial (arts) system EVERY SINGLE was MMA. Whole variant of body techniques and weapons. Only later things began to fracture.
There was an element of combined arms in the Napoleonic period, cavalry forces the enemy to form squares and the horse artillery would hammer these vulnerable formations. The Prussian 1810 manual outlines an attack brigade which contains a careful mix of infantry skirmishers, line, and column with an artillery battery in the rear, flanked on each side a squadron of light cavalry. The French had a similar structure, which the Prussian based their system on. How often they achieved this careful structure is a moot point, but as it took about 2 hours to form up troops to attack, perhaps this was reasonably common.
Communication (lack or bad), training (lack of it) & arrogance (by branches) These will always be an issue.
Nowadays, excessive communication and workload.
@@piotrd.4850 To a degree, but also lazy and stupid soldiers who leadership refuses to properly "correct"
In Combined Arms the key principle is to "Move, Shoot, and Communicate" in simple terms. All units from any fighting formation regarding armor or mechanized infantry divisions apply these principles from their lowest levels. Infantry fire teams, squads, tank crews, gun sections, platoons, companies, troops, batteries, battalions, squadrons, up the chain of command. Every soldier, NCO, and officer has a part in every combat operation. Combined Arms is an overall plan that must be understood, trained, and rehearsed by every soldier under the overall commander assigned to task to upcoming battle or operation. That's the initial plan but contingency plans to that certain operation with different courses of actions because no initial plan survives initial contact with the enemy. Meaning flexibility in command and initiative must be exercised by subordinate commanders to achieve the most important part is the "Commander's Intent". Commander's Intent to achieving the mission is the overall plan to completing the mission in any military operation. Other services like the Air Force, Navy, and Marines can be part of the plan through coordination to a successful operation. Initial attack, and logistical support, and follow through must be considered by the commander through the help of his staff from all branches and services at his hand. Combined Arms tactics takes coordination and synchronization of all commanders with planners to make it all happen.
In WWII smallest unit containing all combined armed component was division. Therefore lowest officer to practice it in peacetime was major-general, in rather large exercises. Now smaller combined armed groups such as BTGs and BTCs allow for some training even on battalion level. And yeas, communicaction offers coordination impossible 100 years ago.
These days we have communication and reconnaissance down to a level we could only dream of 20 years ago, individual's actions in a squad assault are guided and corrected by drone.
Funny, how Gemran Wehrmacht with communication tech from almost century ago, used to pull manouvers impossible for most of today's armies.
Also, the idea is to avoid excessive coordination and comms actually make it bit worse.
Strangely enough once the Germans had fine-tuned their system in 1940, the typical combined arms formation, or Kampfgruppen, was a regiment. Panzer divisions in 1941/42 would often break up into three Kampfgruppen, two would have a panzer battalion and 2 motorised infantry battalion and the third would have two motorised battalions and the reconnaissance battalion. This often also got the anti-tank battalion. So I suspect the nature “largest” combined arms formation is regiment, or Brigade sized. This tends to be what NATO uses these days, which seems to be the structure Ukraine uses as well. The Russian BTG’s lacked sufficient strength to be useful in an heavily opposed attack as they quickly exhausted themselves. In defence it proved successful. The Russians are reforming themselves back into divisional sized formation, although I suspect this would be a small division.
@@peterfmodel Not surprising about Russians BTGs: obscene artillery with limited mobility and insane logistic tail, moderate infantry just to hold the line and token (company - 10 vehicles) manouver component.
The "orchestra" analogy was favoured by (orchestral music lover) John Monash who is one of the earliest adopter-implementers of true combined arms warfare at the battles of Le Hamel and Amiens in 1918.
Would you ever be able to get Dr Peter Lieb onto the channel? He was the military historian at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst when I went through my Officer training. I think he might be at the Center for Military History and Social Sciences of the Bundeswehr now. I think he would be a good guest to get on the channel - he made military history extremely entertaining. Great video btw, I like the comparisons from WW2 to Ukraine.
Most interesting, thank you Bernhard and guest! So much for the flowers, now for the pot... Logistics! Not a word on logistics when the subject is combined arms OPERATIONS!!?? Come on Bernhard, you know better! 😉 Logistics are needed for the build-up before the offensive, but most of all logistics are essential to enable an exploitation phase. We know that supply route constraints will be a crucial consideration to determine axes of attack and advance. And that supply capacity will probably be a major constraint on the speed and ultimate depth of exploitation. As an ex-reserve officer (very modest lieutenant...) in the logistics branch of the (modest) Belgian army, I take exception to the complete omission of logistics in this video 🧐. I demand reparation in the form of a second video where the subject will not be ignored 😠. Anyway, keep up the good job. These videos are brilliant. 😊
In Vuhledar area there were several attacks, not one, but your point is right
Are you sure you were not thinking of Herman Wouks "Winds of War"? I seem to remember the character Victor Henry saying something like "We can produce tanks and artillery pretty quickly, but it takes 18 years to raise a live Boche."
On the one hand, you want competitive people in your armed forces to make sure you have people with drive and who can push themselves in extreme situations rather than freezing or quitting. On the other hand, more competitive people means more competition, animosity and prestige between different branches of armed forces.
Non combined arms is like a default bad habit. You see this every time that people default to the bad habit and get punished but it's harder because it's just their default state to fight the battle in Front of them.
Excellent guest! Have him on more!
Thanks Bernhardt, it's good to hear a fresh perspective on this topic.
it requires planning, coordination, communications, and everyone knowing their roles and responsibilities. Everyone has to be good enough at their respective jobs and disciplined in their execution under fire, such that everyone else can trust them to do their jobs right and on time. But more than that, it requires at least a few people in each element of the operation to have a working understanding of the bigger picture and how the other elements work and are mutually supporting. Infantry Tanks Artillery Air support Engineers etc. all pieces of the puzzle have their role and timing, and some people have to understand this to ensure they do the right things at eth right time. And even harder than that, they need to know when and how to improvise when things don't go to plan. Recognizing when something has been delayed or accelerated, and understanding that you need to likewise delay or accelerate your element accordingly. Or, if an element is getting defeated, how to help them without compromising the overall mission objectives. Also, the ability to recognize when you are winning, even though it didn't go as planned, and to capitalize on that. And doing all of this, without the elements ever getting in each others' way.
Oh, really? Sounds super easy, barely an inconvenience.
Combined arms, I have also heard that combined arms is war as an orchestra... you try getting a 5 piece rock band to play as a group, a tight unit. its not easy. now try a 40 piece classical ensemble, they practice 'till the cows have gone home and come back again, and then still need a conductor for time keeping and cues when playing in front of an audience.
John Monash, an Australian General from WWI, was one of the first proponents of combined arms warfare. He too envisaged it as an orchestra.
You know, that Bayonnete drills were codified by dance instructor, once French invented and implement it?
This video made me think on Agranat comission by the Israelis that investigated their failures before and during the Yom Kippur war. And, how they failed in combined arms and how the clomission proposed solutions. As you say often on the Wehrmacht: "Successful but incompetent". I think this could be an excellent idea for a video.
Always great videos. My only critique, is there’s not enough!
Duration is a barrier too. MHNV and MHV have the point of being interesting deep and enough. For me, 15 to 30 minutes is the ideal. Perun does excellent presentations, that are both in depth and often funny, but often take 1H+ so sometimes you cannot watch it or watch it full in only one watch.
It’s a rock, scissor and paper issue. If you can play all three and pick which one applies, you can win all the time, unless you enemy can also play all three at the same. The ability to play all three elements at the same time takes a very special skill.
Perun has a great line about telling the infantry (or in hus example, the US Marines) what you want them to accomplish at the end. But you dont tell them how to do so. You just turn your head away because you dont want to know how they do it. But only that they do.
that's about leadership, not combined arms. If you try to execute a combined arms attack that way, you'll get everyon killed.
Except, it works ONLY with certain level of training, cooperation, intellgience of your conscripts/privates.
@@piotrd.4850 It doesn't work with conscripts, because they don't want to be there. This is where you need professional soldiers, in an organization that studies and trains. You need a lot of military education on all levels and conscripts just don't stay long enough for that. It's telling that in Ukraine, when the fighting actually started, the Russian infantry did not dismount. The training and philosophy was lacking.
@@recoil53 You really should read on how and why soviet deep battle and top down command styles were develoepd. And what was the difference between WW II era German & Soviet private, both conscripts.
@@piotrd.4850 Properly equipped and in equal numbers, were even late war Soviet Armies as good as the Germans? Like battalion for battalion, would anybody say they were equals? I won't say the Soviets won purely on mass alone, but by then a lot of common soldiers had survived and learned.
Officers are probably evaluated more on how they run their units, than how they co-operate with others.
It is about training priorities and maybe it is necessary to start thinking about integrating at a earlier stage.
Listening to this made me look up close air support for the paratroops dropped in Arnhem in the a Bridge Too Far event. A lack of radio operators able to speak directly to the ground attack Typhoons and a set of rules stopping ground attack aircraft from operating with transport and escort aircraft meant that the paratroops were very much on their own. The Typhoons were capable of taking out armour and had co-operated with the Sherman Fireflies working their way across Holland. They could have destroyed German tanks and cut German lines if used properly, even if they couldn't have attacked German infantry in the town as they were too close to the paratroops. I met some of the paratroops who were dropped at Pegasus bridge on D Day, they were old then and probably gone now, you have to be brave to go to war in a plane with no engine, or to jump out of a perfectly good air plane.
At Vuhledar artillery delivered mines were used to pin the tanks in place. First mine fields were hand laid along the sides of the roads.
They operate at different speeds and excel in different environments and the battlefield is always changing
There is a old engineering maxim that sums it up perfectly the more parts that need to work in tandem the more complicated the macnine
Tempo, OODA-loop, dilemma (multiple complimentary threats), surprise and deception, schwerpunkt, recon pull, maneuver warfare, flexibility by being self-contained, well rounded and redundant? We are only scratching the surface here.
''I do not think friendly fire is a goal in itself'' -Lieutenant Colonel Doctor Tom Simoens :P lovely quote to take out of context
Being a retired US Marine I obviously have a bias toward our way of implementing combined arms. EVERYTHING else exists to support the infantry, because only infantry can seize and hold ground. Yes, tanks, artillery, helos and aircraft frequently cause damage out of proportion to their manpower, but they cannot seize and hold ground.
Tanks as great as they are cannot fight solo. They need infantry and artillery support. And they cannot travel across difficult terrain..or perhaps they can, but the supply trucks carrying fuel and ammo can surely not run into forests and stony bumpy terrain. And those supply trucks need protection. So when tanks conquer terrain, it will sooner or later run out of gas and have to wait for the infantry to catch up so they can protect the flanks so the enemy does not destroy the supply trucks and supply lines to the tanks. So in the end it is infantry that decide the speed of the advance.
Have to keep the armour from running over the infantry, arty from shelling the infantry and close air support from bombing the infantry.
I don't think that mission command is neccesary for combined arms warfare. The red army had succesfull combined arms warfare in the later half of second world war allthough they used a very rigid normal command (Normaltaktiker). The problem of the russians with combined arms warfare is more that they train their army from up to down and their combined arms warfare is on the bataillon level and not like in any other country on the brigade level. So it is very questionable if even the kontraktniki trained the cooperation inside their bataillon tactical group for a sufficient time in the 3 years their contract was going. The ukrainians started to train their army from down to up since 2014 on the other hand. I think one of the reasons the russians invented BTGs was because they thought that they can train combined arms warfare from down to up additionally to their "normal" training.
Except composition of BTGs was purely for static defence. Obscene artillery, limited infantry to hold the line and token armour (1 company - 10 vehicles) for limited manouver.
Combined Arms takes a lot of skilled leadership to implement on a large scale. This is likely why we haven't seen a lot of it in Ukraine by either side as they've both suffered heavy losses in the Officer Bracket of Major to Brigadier General who are generally the ones who have to implement the operational level of military maneuvers. So instead the war has devolved to an artillery duel and skirmishes by platoons.
One aspect is where we tend to put combined arms in context. Often between main arms such as artellity and infantery. This create command and control complications. Its very long line of communication and if we listned to Clausewitz a plan does not hold, all complications can not be for seen. So adjustments that have to be made for one branch or the other becomes very slow. The complexity can be reduced though by integrating artellery in to other arms on a lower level so that line of communication is significantly resuced. Gustavus Adolfus integrated light weight cannons in hia infantery units during the 1600s. So this is not new. The issue have been known for many hundred years I would say. Though the main issue have been solved it might not be considered combined arms. So is this more of an organisational issue more than a tactical one. If you don't organise your military to use combined arms you might still have a reason to organise it as you do. Its some thing we tend to forget. One country might sacrifice the ability to practise combined arms in favor of maybe having a good logistic organisation. Though often its maybe connected to peace time organisation or one optimised for war time operation.
One challenge is wedding math . Say unit A has 3 options: stay, advance, retreat. Unit B also has 3 options. Unit C let's say 4. That's 36 things you can do with your forces and 36 different scenarios logistics will be expected to enable.
Mark V tanks and FT Renaults say Bonjour mes amis.
Initally I thought he was overstating the difficulty od effective CA ops. But his drilling down to the tank driver made his point come to life - Swiss watch .....
The beauty of combined arms is it doesn’t give the enemy a problem, but a dilemma. There is no clear best option. When being suppressed by direct fires, indirect fires, being maneuvered on, communications being disrupted, surrender appeals being texted or pamphlets dropped instructing how to surrender, many units will simply lose all cohesion and break.
Real answer: Because people only have 2 arms naturally, and it is hard to get used to using 3 or 4 more arms.
However, if you’re led by General Grievous…
With tanks it's you then the troop then the squadron and after that infantry , then you add artillery and the air force. It's not easy but you get there with practice . It takes years to get it right
I have never understood interservice rivalry, come on guys youre all on the same team! Work together! Honestly I think this can be solved with militarist education, as in make educational videos about land battles, sea battles, air battles, and historical operations in general so that all people would see how everything must work together to win.
@Baltu Lielkungs Gunārs Miezis It's all about clashing egos, one unit thinks the other is taking the glory and don't like it lol, even Napoleons marshalls had a similar attitude.
It can also be a result of different opinions, I mean there are generally several solutions to a problem. Now add to that, that people will die by solving this problem, so this puts everyone under a lot of stress. At the same time, several people can be correct or wrong at once. So, even without egos, it is already very problematic.
@@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized The main goal is to get people blood boil when some unit made an opening an another just refused to cooperate and didnt exploit it. Creating an attitude that you have to work together. No solution is perfect ofcourse but thats how Id go by it, have soldiers of all levels understand on a casual level what the others are doing.
One of the best examples of combined arms from the 20th century, is Operation Compass. British Armour working in conjunction with Australian Infantry supported by the RAF advanced 800km in 2 months taking over 133,298 prisoners, 400 tanks,1,294 artillery guns, and 500 air craft.
I would love to be interviewed by you ,as someone with combat experience. All things you talk about are just book worm stuff. You talk with other book worm guys ,but not with veterans . Well ,if you need me, I'm here. Zack
Very,very good, just one point for Auftragstaktik best to invite Dr. Peter Lieb.
The more there are moving parts, the more difficult it is to hold together. Check. But on the flip side: It's not about the size (of the unit) but the way you use it. :P
A creeping barrage wasn't possible until the advent of increased artillery accuracy, which became possible during WWI. The tactics of that time owed their origins to the Franco-Prussian War. In 1915, a French officer called Capitaine André Laffargue wrote a paper which created the model for what was eventually referred to as 'Hutier Tactics'. The first serious example of these tactics was by Russian General Alexander Brusilov, in his eponymous offensive in 1916. Hutier used them in the Siege of Riga in 1917. They were also used by Brig. Gen. John Monash at the Battle of le Hamel in 1918. So-called 'Hutier Tactics' were ultimately responsible for breaking the nexus of trench warfare. I can find no information to suggest that any of those commanders actually read the work of André Laffargue. These tactics were, of course further developed with tanks and aircraft. Monash even used ammunition drops at le Hamel. The Wikipedia article incorrectly refers to these methods as infiltration tactics, should anyone want to consult it. The information though, is not bad.
This discussion has proven prescient concerning the challenges the Russians would pose for the Ukrainian offensive.
Because of entropy. Its hard to maintain order even when its sole purpos is to wreck chaos...
Throw a party, or take the last wedding you went to. Afterwards, make an assessment of why all the different folks who were late were late and assign them all hypothetical MOSs Now imagine your best man. Billy is your always ready, always reliable JSOC. He showed, on time, and wrangled some high value groomsmen and women. But they do not a wedding make. Aunt Mae decided not to come. You lover her, but the flight was too long for her old bones. Plus it would've been delayed. Maintenence problems. Because of the pilot shortage a few of your other airborne guests were late as well. One of them was your photographer. They spent hours in luggage trying to find their sensitive equipment. You're going to have to make due with whatever you equipment you can source locally. This should havs pushed the whole wedding back but the logistics of food preparation are already in motion and they were expensive. You can only secure your wedding location for so long anyway. If you don't get your party in soon, you're going to be ejected by larger indigenous forces.
I don't know if you came up with this yourself, or if you stole it from somewhere, but this is one of the best "laymans terms" examples for something I've ever seen.
About the only word, concept I can think of with an even more confused and context specific answer is sword. HEMA in my case, when you're reading the manuals in the original language they can be decidedly unhelpful when they just keep saying sword. Context and art helps define that. Where I might disagree, add to the definition here is that it's used together for a singular, shared objective. It's not just about working together, it's working together with a shared purpose. It's not just for the infantry to get the hill, to spot for the artillery to call in the fire for the tanks to drive around and cause problems. It's taking the hill to dominate the area, to make the enemy agree that his piece of land is in fact, yours. It's a combined objective for all parties, for all to achieve. Otherwise? Yeah, orchestra, will have to remember that for the future. It's a great example. One I perhaps understand more deeply, intuitively because I've been more formally trained, educated in that field. Clarinet and alto sax in my case. Learning how to speak each other's language, that's transposing a key, making your B flats talk to your strings tuned in C, someone needs to play a G key. At least if I remember all of that right. It's been a while.
Ty Can u do a video on whats a main battle tank, wgats a medium tank, Should the tanks turret be at the front or back And should the engine be st tye front or back....
One of them is an easy answer. You want the turret to be in the middle since even moving it just a bit back or forward means a lot more swaying when the hull goes up or down, used to be a lot more relevant in WWII when stabilizers were either non-existent or kinda sucked, but it still matters today. The reason why turrets were moved backwards or forwards anyway were usually due to weight distribution. I.e. the T34 had its engine and transmission all in the back, so there was a lot of weight there, which forced the design to move the turret forward to avoid putting too much weight on the back of the vehicle.
I don't think that's possible. There's so many ways to answer that and that's before we talk about lingo, terminology that's no longer used. I don't even think there's any real solid, singular definition of 'tank' these days. Even saying tank is a role, hides, distorts a lot of information.
Main battle tank and medium tank are basicly the same thing. A role to fight multiple kind of targets including other tanks on the battlefield. After heavy tanks became out of favor every tank capable to destoy other tanks was a main battle tank. From lightly armored tanks like AMX-30 and Leopard 1 to former cruiser or medium tanks like the Centurion and turretless tanks like the S-tank.
A MBT is a bit unclear concept. But genrally speaking can one say that the MBT was born in the late WW2 with say the Centurion tank. WW2 tanks were generally speaking very tall and and not very wide - M4 Sherman is an example of this. And that have some advantages that you can get an overview of the battlefield. But it also made you easier to spot for the enemy and a bigger target that was easy to hit. By making tanks lower profile and wider instead you made your tank harder to see and to hit, and you also made it possible to have a bigger hole in the hull - so that you could fit a bigger turret to your tank and therefore carry a bigger gun there, as a bigger turret meant more room was available to fit a big gun inside. So at the end of WW2 you could see big guns on medium tanks. Guns that were so big that they previously only were used on big heavy tanks. The Russian T-34/85 used a 85mm gun - which can be compared to the massive 88mm gun that the German Tiger tanks. The German Panther medium tank used a 75mm gun with a long gun barrel that fired shots with such high speeds that it could knock through the armor of any allied tank used in the war, even up to the biggest heavy tanks. And the British Centurion was also a powerful machine when it entered service. So now you have medium tanks with guns as powerful as heavy tanks. And they were almost as fast as light tanks. So the new medium tank could therefore start filling almost all roles on the battlefield. While the heavy tank was expensive and was more difficult to mass produce, they could not cross bridges, they were difficult to recover, and its firepower was not much superior to the medium tanks anymore. So the MBTs began to replace the old big monsters. However some exceptions from the rule exists. The Soviet union kept their IS3 tanks and T-10 heavy tanks in reserves til the mid 1990s. While one could argue that Abrams and Leopard2 now weight so much that one could question if they are not near being heavy tanks... and some light tanks were used after WW2 like AMX-13, M41 walker bulldog, M551 Sheridan and cadillac stingray.
Main battle tank became possible when engine improvement allowed speed of light tank by heaviest tank average bridge can carry. You cannot make heavier tank if you want to use regular bridges plus bit more of armor will not save you against modern ammunition. And if you have autoloader, limitation of your gun size is quantity of ammo you can carry. That's your MBT, made simple.
Suggest you research a man called General John Monash. He commanded the Australian Imperial Forces during the later part of the 1st world war. He very successfully introduced the concept of combined arms and showed France, Britain, America, Canada etc. how to do it, leading to the defeat the German army. Amazingly Britain and France didn't take much notice of how the WW1 victory was achieved, yet Germany learned this hard lesson, then studied and used his tactics very successfully in the WW2. He has not been acknowledge very much until more recently.
pretty skeptical about that, for a long time people stated that the Germans invented stormtrooper tactics, nowadays some scholars noted that tactics etc. don't develop in a vacuum and that there are influences from all over the place (all sides), one scholar called it "cross-fertilization".
@@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized Hi Skeptical, Questioning what someone says without going to an effort to find out the facts behind what they claim is a very common response by people who do not want to put in the time & effort to read widely and check cross references or, they simply have never heard of it before. Which... are you? Just because lots of people have said something does not make it true for the same reasons I have already stated. I suggest you read two very well footnoted books; 1. "MONASH, The Outsider Who Won a War," Roland Perry, 2004 Random House Australia. 2. Monash & Chauvel; How Australia's Two greatest Generals changed the course of World History. Roland Perry, 2017, Allen & Unwin Australia. Enjoy the Read. : ) It is truly fascinating for us who have an interest in military history. We are also reminded how much the "Common History" has been written/promoted by the Victorious Powers.
@@martinfalls1023 lol same author and he wrote also a lot of fiction etc. I smell something. Yeah, nice baiting with "effort", cute.
@@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized SIR John Monash was of Jewish/ German heritage. King George V knighted him on 12 August 1918, in the field of battle for the first series of massive defeats of the Germans that eventually ended the war. This was the first such knighthood for a number of centuries I am sorry you feel baited. However, my question of you is serious, direct and genuine. Your intellect would be served well by knowing the facts more thoroughly. One of my sons has said to me; "If someone has arrived at a position without using logic, logic will not persuade them any differently."
@Martin Falls My primary interest is the German Army in WW2, something a lot of people talk and write about, although in many cases they can't even read German. I go to the German military archives to look at documents probably no one has laid eyes on in decades. I also used logic, nearly nothing in warfare was "invented" by one man alone in the last few hundred years particularly not something so complex as combined arms warfare, which is also not that "new". Additionally, your source seems highly questionable. You know how many people want to to read book X, Y or Z in the last few years? Hundreds. And I don't give a rat's ass about his background or that he was knighted.
CAW involves trust. If one branch falls down or just doesn't show up, the results are likely to be heavy casualties on the part of the other pieces of the effort. Down the road people will hesitate when the time comes because they don't trust the previous offender.
Thanks for this so much!
Try to get five players with real time maps and instant communications to coordinate toward an objective in Call of Duty and you'll see why combined arms warfare is so hard.
yes, but they have little to no cohesion and their goals might also not align.
It needs a line of authority ( structured responsibilities) to make it work. As much as we may not like being told what to do by someone with more authority than us, Leadership & Structure are needed to coordinate this combined effort. Small armies, eg. Israel, Australia, have this and do it well.
Before watching my guess would be communication/friendly fire and logistics.
I'm just amazed that in all the wargames I've played of numerous types that not one ever referred to a combined armor and infantry unit as "Combined Arms." It has always been called a "Mechanized Unit." Combined forces generally referred to an armored or mechanized unit fighting in concert with another very different type of force, typically aircraft or helicopter. Armored units combined with infantry riding in armored vehicles wasn't considered anything particularly special or unusual, in fact has been a fundamental unit since WWII. The lack of uncontested air power on both sides of the Ukraine war means that in my eyes "Combined Arms" isn't easily practiced but I guess in the absence of CAS highly coordinated artillery fire might substitute if using precision fire. I find it hard for Russians to be able to perform this kind of close coordination between artillery fire and moving infantry without precision fire. I also assume that today the role of mechanized infantry's role likely has changed as modern tanks should no longer be vulnerable to short range weapons like RPGs. TOW, Javelins, Kornets and other portable AT weapons today even have minimum ranges of hundreds if not thousands of yards/meters which means that infantry within a couple hundred feet probably are less a threat than a decade or more ago. I doubt that Russian infantry can prevent Russian tanks from being destroyed by Javelins when they're 300 yards/meters or more away.
> Combined forces generally referred to an armored or mechanized unit fighting in concert with another > very different type of force, typically aircraft or helicopter. Really depends on the time you look at, for late WW1 tanks and aircraft are not necessary, it is hard enough to coordinate infantry & artillery. > Armored units combined with infantry riding in armored vehicles wasn't considered anything particularly > special or unusual lol, I know plenty of WW2 reports about infantry and tank cooperation, oh boy, I haven't read one that stated "it worked well".
When you get pinned down and can call in air support, mortars, and tanks reliably, you are able to just go march forward. Much like the Russians do only with the combined arms instead of pure infantry and 2 to 3 vehicles tops. It kind of requires secure comms and 1000 other things to go right but when you have been in that position and seen what the backup can do for an infantry assault you wouldn't have it any other way.
Could tou make a video on tank inderecr fire? It seems to be a preferred method of fire by both the Ukrainians and Russians. Is this a viable substitions for direct fire?
I'm not an expert by any means, but I'd think that the limited ability of tanks to raise their guns (relative to mobile howitzers, etc) would put them at a disadvantage for indirect fire. Not impossible, but seems less effective.
@Garret LeBuis that is certainly the case as it limits the range of the gun, however what makes such a technique viable is a drone, correcting artillery fire. But if that's such a good deal, why bother with direct fire weapons heavier than a machine gun in the first place? What are the merits of direct fire weaponry in the 21ct century?
@@joebidome1445 That's an interesting question, and I'm curious to hear from an expert on it.
Tank have smaller calibre and much shorter range then 155mm howitzer. Main advantage is that it can survive being directly hit by 30mm autocannon or having very near miss of heavy artillery shell or airplane bomb, which would destroy self propelled artillery. And tank does not carry too many shells. So, indirect fire by tank is possible, but have sense only if there is no artillery near by to call it for help.
@@mladenmatosevic4591 absolutely true! However, i think that tank crews on both sides prefer indirect fire due to its higher degree of safety.
It requires units to actually go to the field and do realistic, demanding training, for one. Not choreographed "Potemkin" exercises. It requires that you take communications and encryption seriously. It is EXPENSIVE to master. It likely requires a permanent, professional core of Non-commishioned Officers. Sergeants who are technical and tactical experts...and stay in for 20 years.
"shrapnel"? I've had my own vehicle antennas damaged and paint work on the tank damaged. I'd suggest that Waterloo wasn't just like vs like - e.g. Ney's cavalry attacked the British Infantry squares
Wouldn't you want to begin some basic familiarization training in your individual units before you reach the final "live" combined arms training? Basic things like "don't walk in front of a tank, even one of ours." Sounds like good common knowledge that should be shared well before you have to actually work along side one.
Wasnt it arthur currie who came up with the creeping barrage ? In ww1
It's very hard to combine infantry with 125 mm tank gun, 152 mm howitzers, fab-500 and likes of that. When you feel shrapnel you are too far away
Combined Arms is a US Army doctrine that came out of the AirLand 2000. The killing technology keeps proceeding the doctrine. In IRAQ 2, GPS air bombs neutralized the massed opponents before the combined arms assaults can be launched and tested. In Ukraine, Drones and precision artillery will be yet another game changer. Hopefully, Ukrainians has gained battlefield experience that will exceed the helicopter zipping US and Nato general staff carping about how to do a CAW in a war that has attained highest casualties in modern history
> Combined Arms is a US Army doctrine that came out of the AirLand 2000. In the 1920ies the Germans released the H.Dv. 487 „Führung und Gefecht der verbundenen Waffen“ (Command and Combat of Combined Arms). And I am pretty certain it is not the first time the term was used.
@@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized> Yes, you are quite correct and thank you for the military history that is quite objective, interesting, and accurate in my opinion. What I am trying say is that CAW referred to by the Military Analysts on TV is some ideal combination if achieved is unstoppable. Russians must have laid millions and millions of mines already. That alone should be a huge obstacle to the armored forces that do not have air superiority.
Try getting three people to show up for a drink at the same time, and then 10^10000
26:20 We WILLResist and Bite. Bite hard. With all our might.
I find it difficult to use more than 2 arms. I don't even know where to put a third!
Secret communication against the need for constant communication, in combination with bottlenecks in logistics, are major problems
Blitzkrieg's a good example of combined arms warfare.
Thank you, this is probably the best example. Air and Artillery assets providing suppression and disruption, with armored and combat engineers providing breakthrough, with infantry and recon units exploiting the holes.
@@Marcus-ki1en Yes, it is. How did the Six Day War begin? With Israel copying Germany's surprise attack on the Egyptian Air Force, catching its planes on the ground. Then the infantry and tanks went in and exploited it.
@@blaircolquhoun7780 I would also add Operation Compass in North Africa. Richard O Connor's 36,000 Western Desert Force advanced 500 miles through North Africa and in two months cut off and destroyed an Axis army of 150,000 men. The Western Desert Force ended up taking 133,298 prisoners, 400 tanks and 1,290 artillery guns.
@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- Very true. Although the high point of combined arms warfare in North Africa would have to be the Battle of Kasserine Pass. Lloyd Fredendall was caught with his pants down and when you get caught with your pants down in the desert, your ass gets sunburned. Figuratively speaking, of course.
@@blaircolquhoun7780 Lloyd blundered badly yes, but Rodolfo Graziani had his entire 10th army annihilated, out of 150,000 men, they had 148,798 casualties.
Combined arms requires leaders at every level to understand what is happening an echelon above and below. When you train this at the squad, platoon, and company level...as they promote into Battalion and Brigade levels....they know what subordinate units are capable of. I suspect this kind of training doesn't exist in the Russian military and thus they can't coordinate above Battalion level. So they just gave artillery to BTGs and abandoned the attempt at Regimental, Brigade, and Divisional coordination.
It's difficult for the Russians, you need a lot of training to cooperate and work together in a group, good doctrine to actually implement it, and then you need the ability to be flexible and react to the environment, which due to the rigidity of the Russians is generally difficult for them. They have all the right pieces to put in to place holders, but use the troops in big chunks like single blocks, rather than as playing a role in the group and working together. So 50 tanks, or 500 infantry attack a spot by themselves.
Combined arms: understanding & creatively executing the mission command... Doesnt that make the pkan more vulnerable? More ppl know? More leaks? Capture threat of officers worse?
It's too OP, so Sun Tzu had to nerf it. You won't see it in the change-logs, but the organization penalty is there. (For those who are dense, this is a joke.)
Is there a book about maritime combine arms?
Combined arms warfare is unfathomably based.
"Combinedarmswarfare is a word..." ;)
I guess that’s why Americans put so much pressure from the very day of training, to break individuals and make them think about group first.
1:50 I get the 100% hoi3 division designer vibe
Is he really saying that in Waterloo, infantry was fighting infantry , cavalry was fighting cavalry, and artillery was fighting artillery ?
i can combine my arms if i lift both or my arms in arc while my hand do pincers like movements i will suddenly appear as a crab, seems rather easy to me
9:43 peppering
Communication communication communication
Simple way to learn the complexity of training combined arms is to play any form of co-op computer game, and find total refusal to co-operate.
That's normal for trying to play multiplayer SupCom, when you see people actually talking to each other and have specialized air, naval and land players co-operate it can be amazing, but usually it's like herding cats, everyone doing their own thing and at least one player is afk most of the game.
Computer games are like this orchestra where every man is for himself, a guy bangs the drum whenever he feels like it, another guy blows the trumpet 30 decibels louder than all other instruments, the violin plays the right song but in the wrong pitch, and the girl with the clarinette plays a completly other song because she did not like the song the orchester is playing... So everything is just chaos. This is not an orchestra - it is 15 people playing solo in the same room and not caring to cooperate with anyone.
Waterloo absolutely did practice combined arms. Artillery was used against everything, cavalry was charging rears of units distracted by the infantry head on. Ridiculous claim.
One thing that puzzles me is why nobody donates attack helicopters when they were all so hesitant to supply fighter-bomber aircraft.
Refusing a request to fire on concentrations of enemy infantry because it came from an infantry officer? I can't imagine being that arrogant that you'd compromise your own side for this reason.....were they allowed to get away with it? Need court martialling over stuff like that.
I view it as using all tools available cooperatively so as to make a special ‘key’ to unlock the enemy position so it can be defeated at reasonable cost. Nothing is done without regard to losses, rather the effect of such a key will be to render your enemy vulnerable and reduce your losses. Without proper training and skill, a unit might as well not even have attachments of other arms, of course. Too many autocratic nations focus on numbers (Iraq, Russia, Israel’s enemies) and fear to train officers well enough that they are a threat in a coup. Thus, outside of 1930s Germany which inherited a military with a cultural tradition of quality, generally autocrats punch far below their weight in numbers. Putin takes this to an extreme, but Russians will still kill you and can certainly flatten civilian lodging. Thankfully, they aren’t so great at combined arms offensives.